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IN A COUNTERCYCLICAL  public-employment  program,  the government 
attempts  to expand  employment  during  a recession  and its aftermath  by 
creating  additional  jobs in the public  sector.  Congress  and the public  like 
such policies,  but most economists  view them with suspicion.  Since con- 
siderable  experience  with  public-employment  programs  has developed  over 
the past five years,  the time seems right to evaluate  their operation  and 
potential. 
Two caveats  are  in order.  The  first  is that  this  paper  will not address  the 
efficacy  of fiscal  policy  or the desirability  of discretionary  policy  in general. 
Throughout,  expenditures  on public employment  are assumed  to be fi- 
nanced  by borrowing.  The beneficial  effect  of this outlay  on aggregate  de- 
mand or national  product  will be reduced  to an uncertain  degree  by the 
impact  on interest  rates.  Nonetheless,  considerable  evidence  suggests  that, 
on balance,  fiscal  policy  "works"  in the sense  that deficit-financed  govern- 
ment outlays  can increase  gross national  product  and employment.'  The 
Note: This paper was supported  partially  by the Institutes  of Industrial  Relations 
and Business  and Economic Research  at the University  of California,  Berkeley.  I am 
grateful  to the discussants  and members  of the Brookings  panel and to George  Johnson, 
Mark Kendall, and Alan E. Fechter for helpful suggestions;  to Seymour  Brandwein, 
William  Schickler,  and Dick Wagner  of the Employment  and Training  Administration 
for data and advice; and to Leslie Rowland, and the staff of the Income Dynamics 
Project  at Berkeley  for research  assistance. 
1. See Alan S. Blinder  and Robert M. Solow, "Analytical  Foundations of Fiscal 
Policy," in Blinder  and others,  The  Economics  of Public  Finance  (Brookings  Institution, 
1974). 
67 68  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1976 
problem  at hand is to identify  unique  properties  of public  employment. 
What  can direct  job creation  accomplish  that other,  more  traditional,  dis- 
cretionary  fiscal  instruments  cannot? 
Second,  I am concentrating  on one type of public-employment  program 
-a  countercyclical  one-when  at least two other  models  have appeared 
in the literature.  The object of such a program  is restoration  of normal 
unemployment  rates during  a recession  and early  recovery,  and it is de- 
signed to be terminated  as such rates are approached.  In contrast, a 
"structural"  programi  is the public-sector  equivalent  of on-the-job  training, 
and is generally  advocated  as appropriate  even for periods  of relatively 
full employment.  This kind of program  aims to provide  skills to special 
classes  of workers  and  to open  civil service  to those  who have  been  denied 
public  jobs by prejudice  and custom. A job-of-last-resort  program-the 
third model-is  simply income maintenance  with a work requirement. 
During  the past two years,  last-resort  jobs have been proposed  as back- 
stops to wage-subsidy  programs  or as an alternative  to extended  unem- 
ployment  compensation.2 
The Case  for Countercyclical  Public  Employment 
The principal  argument  for a public-employment  policy is that outlays 
on direct  job creation  move the economy  leftward  along  a more  favorable 
Phillips  curve  than could  be traversed  in the same  time and with  the same 
dollar  outlays  spent  on alternative  fiscal  policies.  This  conclusion  is based 
upon certain  presumed  properties  of public-employment  programs  and a 
particular  model of the inflation  process. Four properties  are usually 
stressed  by advocates  of the program: 
(1) Time  shape.  Once initiated,  public  employment  can generate  a de- 
sired  level of expenditures  more  quickly  than can other  purchase  policies. 
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American  Families,"  in Public  Employment  and Wage  Subsidies,  paper 19 of Studies  in 
Public Welfare,  A Volume of Studies Prepared  for the Use of the Subcommittee  on 
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As  a corollary, expenditures from a given appropriation will not have as 
long a "tail" into the future as have, for example, public-works programs.3 
(2) Job impact. Expenditures on public employment are translated di- 
rectly into jobs, in contrast with the effects of expenditure (or tax) policies, 
which occur only as producers  respond to increased demand for goods and 
services. 
(3) Pinpointing. Money spent on public employment can be targeted, 
both geographically and demographically, to an extent not possible with 
other fiscal or monetary policies. This characteristic makes it possible to 
achieve a  better unemployment-inflation combination  or  distributional 
impact than could otherwise be attained. 
(4) Deficit. Because a greater  proportion of public-employment outlays is 
recouped in reduced transfers and higher income tax payments, compared 
with other expenditure policies, such outlays have less impact on the cur- 
rent budget deficit. In theory, the budget deficit can be adjusted to desired 
levels at any time by other tax or expenditure policies, and this attribute 
is of little macroeconomic significance. However, political realities may 
lend importance to the deficit-restraint  characteristic. 
Given these claimed advantages, the effect of a public-employment pro- 
gram on prices is best understood in the context of a standard model of 
inflation familiar to readers of Brookings  Papers. The model has five com- 
ponents: a wage equation; a price equation; a specification of the relation 
between demand for  output  of  the  private sector and  employment;  a 
Keynesian expenditures system that relates demand to income, policy in- 
struments, and other exogenous factors; and a specification of the forma- 
tion of price expectations. 
The wage model is similar to that used by Michael Wachter in his paper 
in this issue, with a few twists. The rate of  change in money  wages is 
assumed to  be a function of the unemployment rates of various demo- 
graphic groups and expected (or recent average) rates of change in some 
class of prices. The effect of a reduction in the unemployment rate of a 
segment of the labor force on aggregate wage inflation is assumed to be 
greater  the bigger the group relative to the total labor force, the higher its 
typical income, the lower its initial unemployment rate relative to "normal" 
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levels, and the greater the responsiveness of its wage to the labor market. 
"Normal" unemployment rates aggregate to the full-employment rate of 
unemployment described  by Wachter; for any demographic group, normal 
rates may differ geographically for structural reasons. The model implies 
that the effect of reductions in aggregate unemployment on rates of wage 
change wiil depend on who is hired. 
In the model, rates of change in prices for private output are related to 
the excess of rates of changes in money wages over rates of productivity 
increase and the level and rate of change of demand relative to capacity. 
Both relationships operate with lags; wage inflation in excess of produc- 
tivity change or an increase in demand for output this quarter will affect 
inflation rates for several quarters  to come. 
Employment shifts with demand for output; but it does so with a lag 
and to a smaller degree, because of inventories, the gradual response of 
production to demand stimulus, and, during an expansion, the increase in 
productivity of  workers on  the job  and lengthening of  the  workweek. 
Unemployment, in turn, responds less to demand changes than does em- 
ployment because the labor force tends to  vary, in the short run, with 
fluctuations in total employment. 
Finally, if the wage model contains expected rates of price change, it 
must be closed with a system for determining expectations since the price 
model determines actual rates of inflation. However expectations might be 
specified, here it is assumed that public-employment outlays have no more 
adverse effects on expectations than do other expenditure policies. 
In the combined model, the effect of an expansion of aggregate demand 
on output prices is determined by the level of excess capacity and changes 
in unit labor costs. As output expands, unemployment diminishes and this, 
plus any direct effects of demand on prices and price expectations, causes 
wages to accelerate. Because of the lagging responses of output and em- 
ployment to an expansion of demand, a substantial  reduction in unemploy- 
ment in the short run requires a much greater stimulus than is necessary 
for the same reduction in the long run. 
In the context of this model the potentially favorable aspects of public 
employment operate in the following way. The expansion in demand for 
labor associated with the program circumvents, in the first round of expen- 
diture, the demand term in the price equation and the lag involving orders, 
sales, production, and employment entailed in ordinary fiscal policy. The 
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effect. The capacity to target allows the job-creating effort to be concen- 
trated on groups and areas where reduction in unemployment puts least 
pressure on wage inflation. Finally, the reduction of transfers minimizes 
any problem posed by an overall constraint on the size of the deficit. 
Thus, for a given effect on the rate of inflation, proponents argue that, 
during a recession, public-employment expenditures are associated with 
gains of  output and employment of greater social value than are other 
fiscal policies. The benefits include the governmental services produced by 
subsidized  jobholders, the enhanced psychological well-being of the other- 
wise jobless, and possibly a socially desirable redistribution of income. 
The heart of the case is that public-employment programs can quickly in- 
crease employment of selected workers. The key words here are "quickly," 
"increase," and  "selected." In  what  follows  I  consider (a)  the  actual 
speed of implementation of public employment; (b) the effect of public- 
employment subsidies on the number of jobs filled by local governments; 
and (c) the process and outcome of the selection of workers for subsidized 
employment. The paper concludes with an assessment of the congruence 
of the theory and reality of public-employment policies and the potential 
for its improvement. 
Implementation  of Public  Employment 
Since  1970 three large-scale public-employment programs have  been 
undertaken.  The first was funded through the Emergency Employment Act 
of 1971 (EEA), the second was initiated by Title II of the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA-II), and the third was the 
product of  the Emergency Jobs and Unemployment  Assistance Act  of 
1974 which amended the original CETA statutes to authorize additional 
job creation (CETA-VI). Finally, a small number of jobs have been created 
using money appropriated for training activities under Title I of CETA 
(CETA-I). 
Figure 1 depicts employment in each of these programs for 1971-75. All 
are still in operation, but the EEA program has dwindled to insignificance. 
Comparison of the programs should help to  identify factors influencing 
the speed of implementation and the actual intertemporal  pattern of expen- 
ditures under such programs. 
How long does it take to get a public-employment program under way? C)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C 
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Public  employment  shares  with other  fiscal  policies  the usual  triad  of rec- 
ognition,  policy,  and outside  lags.4  The recognition  lag, the lapse  between 
the point at which  a fiscal  policy  change  is needed  and the point at which 
this  need  is recognized  by authorities,  is no different  for  public  employment 
than for other discretionary  fiscal  policies.  The policy lag has two com- 
ponents,  legislative  and administrative.  The legislative  component  is de- 
termined  by the  time  it takes  to pass  authorizing  legislation  and  seems  to be 
especially  short  for public-job  bills. My impression  is that, given  executive 
acquiescence,  Congress  will pass a public-employment  bill at the drop of 
a hat. 
The two delays  of significance  are the administrative  part of the policy 
lag-the  time  required  to draw  up regulations  and allocate  funds  to spon- 
soring  agencies-and the "outside"  lag, the time required  for jobs to be 
created  and  filled.  I will argue  that,  under  present  procedures,  the adminis- 
trative  lag for a program  employing  250,000  people now is probably  less 
than  a month  and  the outside  lag in job creation  is less than  two quarters. 
Because  of the small  "sample"  on which  they are  based,  these  conclusions 
are only tentative. 
The  length  of the administrative  lag depends  upon the rules  included  in 
the legislation  to guide  allocation  of funds.  The outside  lag depends  on the 
fiscal  situation  of state and local governments,  the restrictions  placed  on 
eligible  jobs and  job candidates,  the amount  of the subsidy,  and the politi- 
cal pressure  for rapid  job creation.  To appraise  these  elements,  it is neces- 
sary  to review  a few of the basic  characteristics  of these  programs. 
THE  ALLOCATION  OF FUNDS 
The EEA and CETA  programs  transfer  federal  funds  to state  and local 
governments  which serve as program  agents ("prime sponsors"  under 
CETA)  for job creation.  Funds appropriated  under  each program  have 
been  allocated  among  eligible  governmental  units  in accordance  with  some 
subset  of the following  decision  rules. 
Rule 1 (general unemployment):  Allocate  funds among  states  and other 
eligible  areas  in proportion  to the numbers  of persons  unemployed.  For 
4. See Albert Ando and others, "Lags in Fiscal and Monetary  Policy," in E. Cary 
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EEA  this rule  was employed  for interstate  allocations.5  For CETA-VI  the 
initial  allocation  was made on the basis of relative  unemployment  to all 
administrative  units  including  states  as program  agents  for areas  not cov- 
ered  by other,  lower-level,  governments. 
Rule 2 (excessive general unemployment):  Allocate funds among states 
and other eligible  areas with unemployment  in excess of 4.5 percent  in 
proportion  to the share  of unemployment  above 4.5 percent  in all such 
areas.  Again, for EEA this rule was applied  to interstate  allocations;  for 
CETA-VI  the collection  of prime  sponsors  served  as the basis  for distribu- 
tion of funds. 
Rule 3 (concentrated  structural unemployment):  Allocate  funds among 
states and other eligible  jurisdictions  on the basis of unemployment  in 
areas  of "substantial  unemployment"  within  such  jurisdictions.  For EEA, 
an area  of substantial  unemployment  was defined  imprecisely  as one that 
had "sufficient  size and scope  to sustain  a public  service  employment  pro- 
gram"  and that had an unemployment  rate of at least 6 percent  for three 
consecutive  months.6  For CETA  such areas  had to consist of contiguous 
census  tracts  with  a total population  in excess  of 10,000  and an unemploy- 
ment  rate of 6.5 percent  or more for three  consecutive  months. 
Rule 4 (administrative  discretion):  Allocate funds at the discretion of the 
secretary  (that  is, the staff)  of the Department  of Labor.  This  rule is typi- 
cally used for funding  experimental  projects  or for settling  disagreements 
generated  by allocations  under  other  procedures. 
Rules  1 and  2 presume  the  existence  of disaggregated  unemployment  data 
covering  the  jurisdictions  of program  agents.  For all save the largest  stan- 
dard  metropolitan  statistical  areas,  such data are estimated  by state em- 
5. Programmatic  details for EEA and CETA programs  are derived  from conversa- 
tions with local CETA administrators  and the following sources. For the Emergency 
Employment  Act: Sar A. Levitan and Robert Taggart,  "The Emergency  Employment 
Act: An Interim  Assessment,"  in The  Emergency  Employment  Act: An Interim  Assess- 
ment,  Prepared  for the Subcommittee  on Employment,  Manpower,  and Poverty of the 
Senate  Committee  on Labor  and Public  Welfare,  92:2 (GPO, 1972);  Sar  A. Levitan  and 
Robert Taggart, eds., Emergency  Employment  Act: The PEP  Generation  (Salt Lake 
City: Olympus, 1974); and Emergency  Employment  Act of 1971 (Public Law 92-54; 
85 Stat. 146). For the Comprehensive  Employment  and Training  Act, Titles II and VI 
programs:  Federal  Register,  vol. 39, no. 54 (March 19, 1974), pt. 3; Federal  Register, 
vol. 40, no. 7 (January  10, 1975),  pt. 4; Comprehensive  Employment  and Training  Act 
of 1973 (Public Law 93-203); Emergency  Jobs and Unemployment  Assistance  Act of 
1974 (Public  Law 93-567). 
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ployment  services  (SES)  on the basis of data on unemployment  insurance 
claims  adjusted  to the decennial  census  and augmented  by other  informa- 
tion for uninsured  unemployment.  These  data  have not in the past aggre- 
gated  to national  totals  derived  from  the Current  Population  Survey  of the 
U.S. Bureau  of the Census.  The  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  is now develop- 
ing a system  for adjustment  of state estimates  to assure  consistency  in 
aggregate  with CPS totals. That system will simplify  the allocations  of 
funds  for  job creation  in future  programs,  although  the problem  of accu- 
racy of local statistics  will not be eliminated.7 
Rule 3 requires  unemployment  data that are more finely  disaggregated 
than those needed  for rules 1 and 2. Areas of substantial  unemployment 
must be pieced  together  before  any allocations  can be made, and, unlike 
the politically  defined  boundaries  used in the other rules, the size and 
number  of such  areas  will vary  from  year  to year. 
Table 1 shows the allocation  of funds by rule under the three major 
employment  programs.  Whereas  for EEA, 60 percent of all funds was 
allocated  on the basis of readily  available  data on state unemployment 
rates,  for CETA-II  no allocation  could be made before  all areas  of sub- 
stantial  unemployment  were  identified.  Completion  of the allocation  pro- 
cess for CETA-II  money took five months. Final allocations  were not 
announced  until  May 1974.8  This potentially  costly delay  did not, in fact, 
significantly  slow job creation  under  the program,  but only because  no 
appropriation  for CETA  was made until  June 1974. 
I conclude  that  rules  similar  to those  emphasized  in EEA and CETA-VI 
will  not contribute  to the administrative  policy  lag in the future,  while  ones 
like those  in CETA-II  would  substantially  hinder  implementation  of coun- 
7. Data collected for December 1971 in twelve areas selected for "high impact" 
demonstrations  under  EEA illustrate  the seriousness  of this problem.  A special census 
in the designated  areas (all densely  populated  urban  counties) using the CPS question- 
naire  revealed  a substantial  disparity  between  the CPS estimates  of unemployment  and 
SES estimates  made for the same counties for the same month, which were generally 
lower. Moreover,  the pattern  of unemployment  variation  diverged;  the simple  correla- 
tion between  the two estimates  across  areas  was only 0.67. Some of the differences  were 
dramatic:  for San Diego, California,  the SES unemployment  rate was 5.6 percent;  the 
CPS number  was 10.5 percent.  See National Planning  Association,  An Evaluation  of the 
Economic  Impact  Project  of the  Public  Employment  Program,  Final  Report  (NPA, 1974), 
vol. 1, p. 4. Similar  results  were reported  several  years ago by Joseph C. Ullman; see 
"How Accurate  are  Estimates  of State  and Local Unemployment?"  Industrial  and  Labor 
Relations  Review,  vol. 16 (April 1963),  pp. 434-52. 
8. U.S. Department  of Labor, Employment  and Training Administration,  unpub- 
lished allocation  memoranda. 76  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1976 
Table 1. Allocation of Initial Budget Appropriations  for Major New 
Public-Employment  Programs, 1971-75, by Type of Employment  and Act 
Proportion  of initial appropriation,  except as noted 
Comprehensive 
Employmenit  and 
Training  Act 
Emergency 
Type of iunemnploymenta  Employmenit  Act  Title II  Title VI 
General  unemployment  (rule 1)  0.30  ...  0.450 
Excessive  general  unemployment  (rule 2)  0. 30  ...  0.225 
Concentrated  structural  unemployment  (rule 3)  0.25  0.80  0.225 
Administrative  discretion  (rule 4)  0.15  0.20  0. 100 
Total  1.00  1.00  1.000 
Total initial  appropriation 
(millions  of dollars)  1,000  72Gb  875 
Sources: Sar A. Levitan and Robert Taggart, "The Emergency Emllployment  Act: An Interim Assess- 
ment," in The Emergenzcy  Employment Act: An 1Interim  Assessment, Prepared for the Subcommiittee  on 
Employmenlt,  Manpower, and Poverty of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92:2 (Gov- 
ernment  Printing  Office, 1972), pp. 12-15; Federal  Register, vol. 39, no. 54 (Mar-ch  19, 1974), p. 10389; ibid., 
vol. 40, no. 7 (January 10, 1975), p. 2361. 
a.  The rule number refers to decision rules for allocating funds, discussed in the text. 
b. Includes funds for fiscal years 1974 and 1975, based on continuing resolution. 
tercyclical  public employment, although they may be appropriate  for struc- 
tural noncyclical programs. 
THE  NATURE  OF JOBS 
Program agents are authorized to create additional jobs in public agen- 
cies within their jurisdictions, subject to only loose restrictions. CETA-II 
jobs are to be provided to "the extent feasible" in occupations for which 
private and public demand is expanding and are not to  be  "dead-end" 
types of employment; they are to fill "public service needs which have not 
been met and to implement new public services."9  For CETA-VI, emphasis 
on needs was dropped in favor of  "employment projects which provide 
immediate jobs for a maximum number of participants."'" 
EEA and CETA funds may not be used to subsidize employees in jobs 
that otherwise would be filled using local funds, but may be spent to re- 
hire former employees on layoff if a convincing case can be made that 
otherwise they would remain jobless. For CETA-II, subsidy was initially 
9. Federal  Register,  March 19, 1974, pp. 10391-92. 
10. Federal  Register,  January  10, 1975,  p. 2360. Michael  Wisernan  77 
restricted to  entry-level positions  to  avoid  compromising promotional 
opportunities of regular employees. 
The grants provide for total subsidy of wages paid employees in public- 
service jobs up to $10,000 per employee under CETA and $12,000 under 
EEA. In both cases supplements from local funds are allowed when higher 
salaries are paid. The grants also make minor provision for administration 
and training expenses, but none for other overhead expenses. 
THE ELIGIBLE POPULATION 
In contrast to the minimal restrictions on the content of the subsidized 
jobs,  both EEA and CETA regulations have substantially restricted the 
kinds of people eligible for them. With minor exceptions, all programs 
require that only unemployed persons can be hired for subsidized jobs. 
The minimum period of prior joblessness was one week initially for EEA, 
one month for CETA-II, and also  one month for CETA-VI except for 
localities with unemployment rates above 7 percent, where it was cut to 
fifteen days. 
In addition, EEA and CETA regulations specify groups to receive special 
consideration for employment: veterans, the underemployed, the long- 
term unemployed, welfare recipients, members of minority groups, and 
others. The preference  for veterans was backed with administrative quotas 
under EEA, but the other preferences  have not been translated into mean- 
ingful administrative  restrictions. 
Under CETA-II, subsidized jobs  were restricted to  residents of  high- 
unemployment  areas, in order to assist especially the long-term unemployed 
and members of households in poverty. The residence restriction imposed 
by CETA-II did not apply to CETA-VI, and was further reduced by the 
deepening of  the recession, which by  early  1975 expanded greatly the 
number of "areas of substantial unemployment." Moreover, to accelerate 
employment in that year, prime sponsors were allowed to shift funds among 
programs, and that shuffle of funds tended to eradicate the fine distinctions 
among programs with regard to eligible populations. 
One program goal under both EEA and CETA has been a high rate of 
transition of federally  funded  jobholders into regular civil service or private 
employment. The transition goal set for EEA was 50 percent, but it was 
not even approached. Under CETA-II the same goal was established, but 
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half the vacancies occurring  in suitable occupations in [the program agent's] 
permanent work force which are not filled by promotion from within the 
agency."" The "goal" and the penalties associated with noncompliance 
generated  confusion. Under the Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Act, 
these transition requirements were pointedly deemphasized for Title VI 
and, retroactively, for Title II. 
THE RECORD 
The major public-employment programs have differed in the specifica- 
tions for the type of jobs to be provided, the people to be employed, and 
the ceiling amount of the subsidy. In all respects, CETA-II was more re- 
strictive than EEA. As I have pointed out elsewhere, CETA-II restrictions 
raised the costs of employment to prime sponsors and the time required 
to find an eligible jobholder, while lowering the ceiling on wage subsidy 
and the administrative funds provided for hiring and training.'2  Hence, it 
could be expected that jobs would be filled less rapidly in this program 
than in EEA. For CETA-VI, public employment returned to the less re- 
strictive EEA model in most respects. 
The speed of implementation of the programs was also influenced by 
the changing phases of the business cycle. During the last two quarters of 
1971, while EEA jobs were being filled, the unemployment rate remained 
close to 6 percent. From October 1974 to March 1975, the period of rapid 
increase in CETA public employment, the rate rose from 6 to 81/2  percent, 
bringing forth more applicants and greater political pressures for rapid 
job creation. 
On the other hand, the financial condition of state and local governments 
was much worse during the implementation of CETA in 1974-75 than was 
the case for EEA in 1971-72. During 1971, the budgets of state and local 
governments  (not including social insurance trust funds) showed declining 
deficits; in 1972 they moved into surplus on the national income accounts 
basis. The surplus began to decline in early 1973 and, by the time of imple- 
mentation of  CETA-VI, a  substantial deficit had developed. Given  the 
11. Federal  Register,  March 19, 1974, p. 10393. 
12. See Michael  Wiseman,  "On Giving  a Job: The Implementation  and Allocation  of 
Public Service  Employment,"  in Achieving  the Goals of the Employment  Act of 1946- 
Thirtieth  Anniversary  Review,  vol. 1, Employment,  A Study Prepared  for the Use of the 
Subcommittee  on Economic Growth of the Joint Economic Committee,  94:1 (GPO, 
1975). Michael Wiseman  79 
Table 2.  Jobs Targeted and Jobs Created  in the First Six Quarters 
under  Major Public-Employment  Programs, 1971-75 
Comprehensive  Employment 
Emergency  and Training  Act 
Employmenzt 
Characteristic  Act  Title  II  Title VI 
Target  number  of jobs, year 1 (thousands)a  139  90b  109 
Date of initial allocation 
of appropriationsa  August 1971  June 1974  January  1975 
Jobs at end of quarter  (thousands)c 
1  31.5  8.0  102.5 
2  119.2  37.3  124.4 
3  148.4  122.0  213.3 
4  173.1d  172.0  268.7e 
5  144.9  109.1  ... 
6  135.5  69.6  ... 
Months to target  achievement'  8  7  3 
Source: U.S.  Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, unpublished program 
data. 
a.  The target number of jobs is based on the initial congressional appropriation. For CETA-II the initial 
allocation is $370 million in fiscal year 1974 funds plus $350 million in continuing-resolution  funds for fiscal 
year 1975. For CETA-VI the initial appropriation of $875 million was supplemented by $1,625 million at 
the beginning of quarter  3. 
b.  At estimated cost of $8,000 per job. 
c.  Quarters  are measured relative to month of initial allocation. The month of allocation is month 1 of 
quarter 1. 
d.  Does not include jobs funded for Neighborhood Youth Corps. 
e.  Preliminary. 
f.  Rounded to nearest month. 
limited nature of public-employment  subsidies,  the worse the financial 
condition  of state and local governments,  the less may be their ability  to 
utilize the subsidies  and particularly  to engage in any imaginative  con- 
coction  of new employment  opportunities. 
Finally,  when EEA was implemented,  manpower  revenue  sharing  was 
new, and hence  the necessary  network  of program  administrators  had to 
be established.  For subsequent  programs,  including  CETA-VI,  the struc- 
ture  was  in place  and  ready  to respond  to any change  in the availability  of 
funds  from  Washington. 
Table 2 records  the job creation  under each of the three programs 
measured  relative  to the date of the initial  allocation.  These data suggest 
that  the lag in implementation  is, to coin a phrase,  moderate  and  variable. 
The  actual  pattern  is consistent  with  the hypothesis  that  the greater  restric- 
tiveness  of CETA-II  did significantly  retard  implementation,  relative  to 80  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1976 
EEA  and CETA-VI,  whatever  its merits  in targeting  jobs more  effectively. 
The relaxation  of restrictions  and the rapid increase  in unemployment 
apparently  combined  to accelerate  job filling  under  both CETA  programs 
during  the  first  two quarters  of 1975,  despite  the adverse  financial  condition 
of state  and  local  governments.  In the six months,  job creation  by CETA-1I 
and CETA-VI  combined  totaled  222,700;  by the end of August, 281,200 
jobs had been  filled. 
These  totals suggest  that a six-month  target  of 250,000  jobs (or a few 
more) is reasonable  in any renewed  effort that might be undertaken  in 
similar  circumstances,  including  (a) an established  network  of program 
agents,  (b) an ongoing  public-employment  program,  (c) minimal  restric- 
tions  on eligible  employees  and  employment  outcomes,  and  (d) a high  and 
rapidly  increasing  unemployment  rate. The first  condition  will be met as 
long  as the  country  maintains  its "revenue  sharing"  approach  to manpower 
policy.  The  second  was  fortuitous  and  may  not be duplicated  again,  unless 
some  element  of the public-employment  program  is made  permanent.  The 
importance  of the last two conditions  is a matter  of conjecture.  The rate 
of job creation  by local governments  in response  to a grant  program  like 
that provided  by CETA  or EEA is a function  of local costs and benefits, 
and any meaningful  restriction  on eligibility  raises  costs. The administra- 
tive changes  in the CETA  program  at the end of 1974  clearly  enhanced  the 
rate of job creation.  Similar  achievements  in the future  will require  the 
same  flexibility  unless  incentives  are enhanced  or methods  are devised  for 
lowering  costs. 
TERMINATION 
Successful  implementation  of countercyclical  public employment  re- 
quires  prompt  program  termination  when  prosperity  is restored.  Given a 
fixed  appropriation,  a program  that gets started  and reaches  employment 
goals  quickly  will also close promptly,  since  the sooner  the jobs are filled 
the more  rapidly  funds  are exhausted. 
Reality  is not quite so simple,  for two reasons.  First, because  jobs are 
not filled  instantly,  a reserve  of funds  develops  under  fixed  appropriations. 
Unless  the program  requires  that such unspent  money  be returned  to the 
Treasury,  either  program  employment  goals  will  be exceeded  at some  point 
or expenditures  will be extended  beyond  the intended  horizon.  The former 
problem  arose  with EEA by the summer  of 1972  and resulted  in a freeze Michael  Wiseman  81 
on replacement  of workers  who voluntarily  quit or obtained  unsubsidized 
jobs, which  in turn led to reduction  of the transition  rate as sponsoring 
governments  tried  to maintain  their  subsidies  by keeping  existing  employees 
in place.'3  Under  CETA  an attempt  was made  to prevent  a similar  occur- 
rence;  overall  public  employment  has been stabilized  at around  300,000. 
Second,  terminating  people's  jobs is always  politically  difficult.  A pos- 
sible procedure  for minimizing  the burden  on workers  and politicians  of 
closure  is to rely on natural  attrition  as subsidized  jobholders  move into 
private  or regular  employment  or leave  the labor  force.  As EEA  experience 
demonstrated,  however,  such a policy creates  incentives  for local govern- 
ments to slow transition  into regular  agency  jobs and to do as little as 
possible  to assist  jobholders  in locating  private  employment. 
The alternative  seems  to be setting  a limit on tenure  for temporary  em- 
ployees,  backed  up by provision  for assistance  in job search  and  retraining 
for  jobholders  who  reach  the end of their  tenure  without  finding  alternative 
employment,  and by funding  to program  agents  that is independent  (or a 
positive  function)  of the rate of transition  of their temporary  jobholders 
into unsubsidized  employment.  The fixed-tenure  requirement  keeps  public 
employees  "in  the labor  market,"  exerting  a restraining  influence  on wages 
and  reducing  the extent  of job-search  assistance  necessary  on termination. 
It also allows  a program  to be brought  to a halt in about  a year. 
The Problem of Displacement 
Viewed  skeptically,  the numbers  in table 2 show only that when free 
money  is available,  local governments  will rise  to the bait. Once  the grants 
are  taken,  their  effect  on output  and  joblessness  will  depend  on other  effects 
they  may  have  on state  and  local government  budgets.  To what  extent  does 
money  passed  to lower-level  governments  in employment  subsidies  create 
incremental  jobs?  In other  words,  to what  extent  are  regularly  hired  state 
and  local employees  displaced  by workers  paid out of federal  grants? 
Even  with a substantial  rate of employment  displacement,  the program 
may  have  sizable  overall  effects  on aggregate  demand,  depending  upon  how 
much  it raises  other  local government  expenditures  or reduces  local taxes, 
rather  than merely  raising  surplus.  The displacement  of expenditures  by 
13. Sar A. Levitan and Robert Taggart, "Summary  Report I: An Overview,"  in 
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state  and  local governments  resulting  from grants  for public-employment 
programs  will  probably  be less  than  the displacement  of employment,  since 
both  EEA  and CETA  subsidize  only  wages  paid,  and since  the production 
of public  services  requires  nonlabor  inputs  as well as workers.  As a result, 
funds  released  by modest  displacement  are most likely  to be used to pur- 
chase  goods and services. 
As the rate  of employment  displacement  increases,  however,  so does un- 
certainty  about  the general  impact  of the expenditure.  For most purposes, 
analysis  of displacement  of employees  may suffice.  If that is large  in the 
short  run-say,  over a year-countercyclical  public  employment  loses its 
raison  d'etre  and  the size of the multiplier  no longer  matters.  If it is small, 
funds  not spent  on wages  of incremental  employees  probably  go into gov- 
ernment  purchases  of goods and services.  Over  the long run,  displacement 
seems  unavoidable  as successive  budgets  are adopted  and both program 
agents  and  the administering  bureaucracy  lose  perspective  on what  employ- 
ment  would  have  been  in the absence  of such  funds.  In itself,  the extent  of 
long-run  displacement  has  no relevance  to the effectiveness  of the short-run 
countercyclical  program.  At most, the path of adjustment  of employment 
to the long-run  level  may  provide  some  information  about  the employment 
effects  over the time horizon  that is critical  for countercyclical  purposes. 
Only  two estimates  of short-run  employment  displacement  by public  em- 
ployment  grants  are  available.'4  The  first,  made  by George  E. Johnson  and 
James  D. Tomola,  is based  on time-series  data  on aggregate  state  and  local 
employment;'5  the second  was  prepared  using  microgovernmental  data  by 
14. In addition,  one long-run  evaluation  has been  made  by Alan Fechter.  He obtained 
a measure  of displacement  by first estimating  the impact of public-employment  grants 
on overall expenditures  and then translating  the expenditure  effects into jobs created. 
(That reverses  my preferred  approach of first evaluating  the net impact of a public- 
employment  program  on jobs filled, then calculating  the amount of funds released  by 
displacement,  and finally  speculating  on the disposition  of these funds.)  In his first  step, 
Fechter relied on lonig-run  estimates of the impact of grants of various  types on local 
government  expenditures  and therefore  his estimate  of the impact  of public-employment 
grants  on jobs filled by such governments  are really  long-run  estimates.  It is likely that 
the short-run  effects of public-employment  grants on the wage bill and total expendi- 
tures differ  from those of the categorical  and lump-sum  grants on which his estimates 
are based. See Alan E. Fechter,  "Public  Employment  Programs:  An Evaluative  Study," 
in paper 19 of Studies  in Public Welfare. 
15. George E. Johnson and James D. Tomola, "The Efficacy  of Public Service  Em- 
ployment  Programs,"  Technical  Analysis  Paper 17A (U.S. Department  of Labor,  Office 
of the Assistant  Secretary  for Policy, Evaluation,  and Research, 1975; processed).  The 
estimate  was originally  circulated  in a working  paper  for the Office  of Policy, Evaluation, Michael Wiseman  83 
the National Planning Association.'6 The two yield substantially different 
estimates of short-run displacement; both seem to be seriously flawed. 
AN  AGGREGATE TIME-SERIES ESTIMATE 
To estimate the rate of displacement of locally funded jobs by those sub- 
sidized through EEA, Johnson and Tomola regressed aggregate nonsub- 
sidized employment not associated with education in state and local gov- 
ernment on real personal income minus federal taxes (plus state and local 
indirect business taxes) lagged four quarters, EEA-subsidized jobs,  and 
nonsubsidized jobs  lagged one  quarter, all  expressed per capita, using 
quarterly data for 1956:1 to 1973:2. The estimated equation includes sea- 
sonal dummies and a linear time trend; it fits the data well, and the public- 
employment term in the regression has a statistically significant negative 
coefficient. The results indicate that the immediate impact of creating one 
hundred federally  subsidized  jobs is a reduction in nonsubsidized state and 
local employment of  twenty-nine jobs,  leaving a net increment to  state 
and local government employment of seventy-one. After eight quarters, 
however, that net increment  has eroded to only about thirty-three,  the long- 
run effect. 
Five problems make it hard to  accept the Johnson-Tomola estimate. 
First, wages do not enter the model, which, in effect, is a demand equation 
without  a  price variable. The  time  trend is  meant  to  "[approximate] 
changes in relative prices and in community preferences."'7  But, in fact, 
relative prices did not change linearly over the seventy quarters  of the data. 
As has been pointed out by others, wages in the public sector began rising 
rapidly in absolute terms and relative to earnings in the private sector in 
the late 1960s.'8  Data from the Census of Governments show a 5 percent 
jump in the average real payroll cost of fuiltime equivalent state and local 
government employees in 1972 alone.'9  This jump is closely correlated with 
and Research  in the Department  of Labor; it subsequently  was cited in the 1975 Eco- 
nomic  Report  of the  President,  pp. 124-25, the 1975 Manpower  Report  of the  President, 
p. 46, and in Congressional  Budget Office,  Temporary  Measures  to Stimulate  Employ- 
ment: An Evaluation  of Some Alternatives  (CBO, 1975), p. 38. My comments in this 
section cover only a fraction  of this interesting  paper. 
16. National Planning  Association, Evaluation  of the Economic  Impact  Project.  The 
displacement  estimates  are described  in vol. 3, app. M. 
17. Johnson  and Tomola, "Efficacy  of Public Service  Employment  Programs,"  p. 9. 
18. Charles L. Schultze and others, Settinig  National Priorities: The 1973 Budget 
(Brookings  Institution,  1972),  p. 297. 
19. U.S. Bureau  of the Census,  Public  Employment  in 1974 (GPO, 1975),  p. 8. 84  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1976 
the advent of EEA. The public-employment term in the Johnson-Tomola 
regression takes on a nonzero value only in the last eight of the seventy 
observations. This coincidence of  public-employment programs and in- 
creases  in wage cost could exaggerate the extent of displacement, especially 
since militance on the part of public employees and wage gains may have 
been greatest in large cities, the site of much EEA employment. 
Second, the model is ill-equipped to deal with short-run adjustment of 
employment to cyclical variation of revenue in the public sector. In the 
Johnson-Tomola analysis, demand for public employees is derived from 
the demand by citizens for public services. This, in turn, is assumed to be 
a function of personal income minus federal income taxes. State and local 
indirect business taxes are added to adjusted personal income presumably 
on the assumption that such taxes are shifted forward. As indicated above, 
the income variable enters with a four-quarter lag, and no allowance is 
made for the effects of  short-term, recession-induced reductions in  tax 
yields or price changes on state and local government employment. If used 
to simulate the impact of, say, a sudden fall in personal income on state and 
local employment, the model would predict no effect at all for four quarters. 
If, in reality, state and local governments slow the hiring of new em- 
ployees or replacement  of old ones more promptly as revenues falter during 
a recession, the result will show up in the Johnson-Tomola model as a neg- 
ative residual.20  If a public-employment program is initiated at the time 
such adjustments are under way, the subsidized employment term in the 
model will be correlated with the residual and its coefficient will be biased 
downward, perhaps exaggerating the extent of displacement. 
Third, Johnson and Tomola assume that unsubsidized employment of 
state and local governments is adjusted to desired levels at the same rate in 
response to introduction of  subsidized employees  as in response to,  for 
example, a change in income. The impact is distributed over a long period 
with proportionately the greatest share of adjustment occurring in the first 
quarter  in which subsidized employees are introduced. The functional form 
adopted permits no other conclusion. Yet both federal representatives and 
20. The overestimate  of employment  will be reduced somewhat over time by the 
presence  of the term for employment  in the preceding  quarter.  But in a "partial  adjust- 
ment" model of this type, the coefficient  of the lagged employment  term has a specific 
interpretation  that affects  the estimated  long-run  displacement  effects of subsidized  em- 
ployment.  Any bias induced in the coefficient  of lagged employment  by its correlation 
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local public  employees  are  most diligent  about  avoiding  displacement  dur- 
ing the first  quarter  of implementation;  most on-site  observers  argue  that 
displacement  creeps  in later-after the "heat"  is off.2"  This time shape  of 
displacement  is critical  for the use of subsidized  employment  as counter- 
cyclical  policy.  Hence,  the  particular  constraint  on the  functional  form  they 
use seems  inappropriate. 
Fourth,  more than one type of displacement  occurred  at the time of 
implementation  of EEA. The Nixon administration  chose to utilize  EEA 
funds  for summer  jobs for youth  that in preceding  years  had been funded 
through  other  programs.22  The number  of such  jobs was substantial,  ap- 
proximately  100,000  in June  1973.  The displacement  of summer  youth  jobs 
by EEA  summer  youth  employment  was 100  percent,  and the inclusion  of 
the  latter  in the data  used  for analysis  of displacement  by local government 
probably  biases  upward  the estimated  degree  of displacement.23 
Finally,  since  data on employment-program  jobholders  are not reliably 
disaggregated  either  by  job type or by type of employer,  it is impossible  to 
separate  EEA  (or, for that matter,  CETA)  employment  in educational  ca- 
pacities  from  that in other  governmental  functions.  Johnson  and Tomola 
use a rough  estimate  that 19 percent  of all EEA  jobs were  in education- 
related  activities.  This  cumulative  figure  probably  disguises  important  vari- 
ation over  time and may differ  from  the composition  at any one time be- 
cause of differences  in turnover  between  employees  in subsidized  jobs in 
education  and those located  elsewhere  in state and local government.  Its 
use creates  "errors  in variables"  problems  on both the left- and  right-hand 
sides  of the Johnson-Tomola  equation. 
Aside  from  the transfer  of summer  youth  employment  to a separate  title 
of CETA,  these problems  have not been alleviated  with later public-em- 
ployment  programs.  If anything,  the prospect  of gleaning  a reliable  dis- 
placement  estimate  from time-series  data is now less promising  because 
public  employment  is spread  over  four  programs  instead  of one, and each 
may  have  a different  displacement  effect.  I have  experimented  with  a model 
similar  to that employed  by Johnson  and Tomola; it differs  in that it in- 
cludes  a wage  term, adjusts  employment  figures  for summer  jobs, covers 
employment  in both education  and other governmental  activities,  intro- 
21. Later  in this section I comment  on these reports. 
22. Levitan  and Taggart,  "An Overview,"  p. 17. 
23. Summer  employment  of youth is handled  under  a separate  title of CETA. Sum- 
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duces  a more  elaborate  lag structure  for income,  incorporates  a different 
seasonal-adjustment  procedure,  and  extends  the  sample  period  to 1975.  The 
results  indicate  that  inclusion  of a wage  term  does  reduce  the displacement 
estimate  but that slight modifications  in the functional  form and time 
period covered  can move estimated  short-run  displacement  rates from 
virtually  zero to as high as 80 percent. 
AN  ESTIMATE USING  CROSS-SECTION DATA  FOR CITIES 
Of the funds  appropriated  for the Emergency  Employment  Act, $65  mil- 
lion was devoted  to a "high-impact  demonstration  project,"  in which  pro- 
gram agents  in California,  Illinois, New Jersey,  New York, and South 
Carolina  were  given  unusually  large  grants  for public  employment  to test 
the impact  of such procedures  on local labor markets.  Whereas  the slots 
funded  by the EEA  programs  were  sufficient  to hire  between  1 and 1.5  per- 
cent of the unemployed  nationwide,  those allocated  to the demonstration 
areas  were  numerous  enough  to employ  about  7.7 percent  of the  jobless  in 
all those areas  as of December  1971.24 
The National Planning  Association  (NPA), which performed  a wide- 
ranging  evaluation  of the  high-impact  experiment,  estimated  that,  for every 
one  hundred  jobs created  in the  high-impact  demonstration  area  during  the 
fall of 1971, net employment  by the participating  governments  was in- 
creased  by only fifty-four  slots as of the following  October.25  This is the 
only  displacement  estimate  available  that  is based  on cross-section  data  for 
individual  governments. 
The NPA's procedure  for deriving  this result is straightforward.26  To 
obtain  a control  for evaluation  of displacement,  every  government  in the 
demonstration  areas was matched  with another  unit in the same state. 
Elaborate  efforts  were  made  to assure  that  the comparison  government  was 
of the same  type,  differed  in total  employment  from  the demonstration  unit 
by no more  than  5 percent,  and  had  employees  distributed  across  functions 
in roughly  similar  proportions.  The average  difference  in employment  be- 
tween  experimental  and  control  groups  was  calculated  using  data  from  the 
Census  of Governments  for October 1967, 1969, 1970, and 1971. This 
24.  National  Planning Association,  Evaluation of the Economic Impact Project, vol.  1, 
p. 6. 
25. Ibid., p. 112. 
26. Ibid., vol. 3, app. M. The description  that follows is taken from this appendix. Michael Wiseman  87 
average  was  used  to predict  the expected  difference  for October  1972;  if the 
difference  showed  a trend,  this trend  was projected  for the 1972  forecast. 
Employment  by the "control"  governments  plus  the estimated  difference 
between  control  and experimental  governments  was used to predict  em- 
ployment  in the experimental  sites for October  1972.  The difference  be- 
tween  actual  and predicted  employment  could then be calculated  and di- 
vided  by EEA  employment  in the experimental  sites  for an estimate  of the 
proportion  of subsidized  jobs that  were  actual  increments  to local govern- 
ment  employment-the "creation  rate." 
The results  of the experiment  were  flawed  by three  things:  (1) the data 
for the control  group  were  contaminated  by the presence  in the employ- 
ment  figures  of an unknown  number  of jobholders  hired  with  EEA funds; 
(2) the NPA miscalculated  the displacement  rate; and (3) no adjustment 
was made  for the actual  pattern  of implementation. 
The importance  of these problems  can be illustrated  by examining  the 
ideal formula.  I concentrate  for illustration  on data for all governments 
combined  rather  than on any disaggregation.  Let EH* represent  the pre- 
dicted  average  employment  (ignoring  public  employment)  in the high-im- 
pact governments;  EC is average  employment  in the  control  governments; 
EH is actual  average  employment  for high-impact-area  governments;  d* 
is the predicted  difference  between  employment  in the high-impact  and 
the control  governments;  a  is the creation  rate over the horizon  of the 
NPA experiment  (1-  a is the displacement  rate);  and  PH is public  employ- 
ment in the high-impact  sites,  all measured  as of October  1972.  Then, 
EH*  =  EC  +  d*, 
and 
EH-  EC-d* 
(1)  aa=  PH 
The numerator  represents  the net "unexpected"  extra  jobs and the de- 
nominator  is the gross  contribution  of public  employment. 
For the combined  sample,  d* was estimated  to be 35, EH averaged  683, 
EC was 631,  and  PH averaged  34 for the high-impact-area  governments.27 
These numbers  substituted  in equation 1 suggest  a creation  rate of 0.5, 
which  reflects  substantial  displacement. 
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Now the problems: The last observation for estimation of d*, that for 
October 1971, already involved some EEA jobs. The NPA reports that 7 
percent of jobholders in demonstration areas were on the job in October.28 
This would be, on average, about two and one-half people per demonstra- 
tion-area government. Presumably, some EBA jobs were also filled among 
the control group at this time, but no data were collected for this group. 
While EEA employment was ultimately above average in the demonstra- 
tion projects,  jobs were filled less rapidly there. Therefore, the effect of this 
contamination on the observed difference in October 1971 is uncertain. I 
shall assume that the effects cancel out and the estimated d* remains 35. 
The NPA's adjustment will be shown later. 
Although the size and significance of EEA employment in October 1971 
is a matter of doubt, plainly there was substantial EEA employment in the 
control group by October 1972. The NPA estimates the extent of such em- 
ployment to be 1.5 percent of all jobs filled in the control group on the basis 
of national data on EEA hires as a proportion of all state and local em- 
ployees. To account for this, expression 1 must be modified, and the adjust- 
ment must incorporate an assumption about the extent of displacement in 
the control group. Assuming the same adjustment is appropriate for both 
control and experimental groups, expression 1 becomes 
EH  -  (EC  +  d*  -  a/EC) 
(2)  a=  PH 
where A is the proportion of average employment in the control areas that 
is federally subsidized. Solving for a, 
EH-EC-d* 
PH-j3EC 
Adjustment for control contamination in October 1972 (assuming A  = 
0.015) raises the estimate of the creation rate to  0.69. Inexplicably, the 
NPA adjusted equation 1 for contamination by multiplying the numerator 
by 0.985, the proportion of employees assumed not to be subsidized by 
EEA in the control group, and subtracting half the number of EEA em- 
ployees in place in the demonstration areas in October 1971. The result is a 
higher displacement rate, for which a standard error of 0.04 is claimed.29 
As formula 3 indicates, these estimates are exceedingly sensitive to the 
assumption made about O.,  a parameter for which no data were collected. 
28. Ibid., p. M-15. 
29. Ibid, vol. 1, p. 112. Michael Wiseman  89 
If it is 0.02 instead of 0.015, the creation estimate rises to 0.80; if ,B  is 0.01, 
on the other hand, the estimate of a becomes 0.61. 
The result rests precariously on the assumption that the same displace- 
ment rate applied to both the control and the high-impact cities. Despite 
the NPA's assertion that the rate will vary with time, it is not adjusted for 
the time pattern of job creation in the demonstration or control sites. It 
implies that marginal and average displacement rates are equal (as do the 
time-series estimates in the preceding section). Perhaps, for smaller num- 
bers of subsidized  jobs, the displacement effects would have been greater. 
The governments in these "demonstration sites" knew  their public-em- 
ployinent efforts would be evaluated by an independent consulting firm; 
thus, the "Hawthorne effect" may have restrained displacement. These 
factors, plus the imprecise character of some of the underlying numbers, 
must lead to substantial reservations about the NPA estimate.30 
ON-SITE EVALUATION 
A third source of information on displacement is provided by reports of 
on-site observers of program implementation. Levitan and Taggart, for 
example, conclude from such evaluations that "at the outset, the level of 
PEP jobs represented  net additions to the total number of public employ- 
ment opportunities."'"  These estimates must also be viewed with reserva- 
tions. It is difficult for an outsider to gauge displacement by looking at the 
first jobs in local government that subsidized workers do. Such jobs can 
change quiCkly  over time, and the actual employment effect of subsidized 
jobs depends not only on what new workers do but also on what is happen- 
ing simultaneously to the duration of vacancies in unsubsidized slots. Pos- 
sibly the process of adjustment to subsidized employees "displaces" em- 
ployment even while each subsidized employee begins work on a job that 
all observers might agree is "new." 
Most  state and local  governments have employment screening proce- 
dures that are adapted to the normal rate of turnover of their labor force. 
30. The NPA provides  estimates  of the creation  rate also by type and size of govern- 
mental unit. The estimates range from 1.11 for cities and towns to 0.17 for special 
districts,  and are subject  to the same problems  encountered  with the aggregate  figures. 
However, they do suggest possible behavioral  differences  that could lead to a better 
understanding  of the displacement  process  if it is systematically  studied.  See ibid., vol. 3, 
p. M-16. 
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The evidence  that is available on turnover in local government suggests that 
this rate is low compared to experience in the private sector.32  While EEA 
and CETA  jobs may not represent  a significant  increment to total state and 
local employment, the number is substantial compared to the rate of turn- 
over over the period in which they were filled. When the employment effort 
of local government is directed toward applicants for subsidized jobs, the 
duration of unsubsidized  vacancies may rise, offsetting part of the employ- 
ment effect of the subsidized employment. Once subsidized  jobholders are 
in place, these governments can reorient their employment facilities toward 
unsubsidized  vacancies. In the absence of other effects, this might produce 
a gradual reduction in the displacement effect over time. However, the 
passage of time also permits reallocation of duties so that subsidized em- 
ployees initially employed on "new"  jobs come increasingly  to perform old 
ones, thereby translating a temporary displacement into a permanent one. 
The displacement generated by this "digestion" process cannot be de- 
tected by looking at the nature of the jobs initially filled by subsidized em- 
ployees. What must be inspected are changes in the vacancy rate for un- 
subsidized jobs at the time of implementation of subsidized employment 
and the tasks of subsidized employees in quarters  subsequent  to initial hire. 
Any increase in the duration of vacancies in unsubsidized employment re- 
duces the effect of the countercyclical jobs  program. Such changes are 
difficult to observe on site, but may be reflected in aggregate employment 
statistics. 
WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE 
I can offer no definitive estimates of the displacement effect. The esti- 
mates derived by Johnson and Tomola from time-series data appear on 
balance to be biased toward exaggeration of displacement. The impressions 
provided by on-site observation are likely to err in the opposite direction, 
because they do not encompass any indirect displacement effects operating 
through hiring procedures and duration of vacancies of unsubsidized slots. 
All told, the best available number is that based on the NPA study after 
adjustment:  it suggests that displacement over approximately  three quarters 
is no higher than 40 percent. The "displaced" funds will presumably have 
32. Frank  Levy and I estimate  that the annual  turnover  rate in low-skill  jobs in the 
city govermnent  of Oakland,  California,  may be less than 10 percent.  See Frank Levy 
and Michael Wiseman, "An Expanded Public-Service  Employment  Program: Some 
Demand  and Supply  Considerations,"  Public  Policy, vol. 23 (Winter  1975),  p. 121. Michael Wiseman  91 
the same  impact  on employment  as would  added  funds  for general  revenue 
sharing;  the bulk  of the funds,  which  are  not displaced,  are  likely  to exert 
a substantially  greater  impact on employment  than that provided  by 
revenue  sharing. 
The rate of displacement  is probably  lower under CETA than under 
EEA. In the more  recent  program,  procedures  for policing  maintenance  of 
effort  are somewhat  more  rigorous,  and administrators  seem more aware 
of the potential  for displacement  and more involved  in policing  prime- 
sponsor  activity  now  than  was  the  case  in 1971.  Also, since  CETA  job crea- 
tion occurred  under  far more adverse  general  economic  conditions  than 
were  true  for EEA, displacement  related  to "digestion"  was probably  less 
of a problem;  job turnover  in local government  may have  been  lower  and 
the  number  of vacancies  arising  in unsubsidized  jobs  may  have  been  smaller. 
On the other hand, the financial  condition of state and local govern- 
ments  was  considerably  worse  during  the first  half of 1975  than  during  the 
fali of 1971.  While  this situation  may have assured  that little or no CETA 
money  made  its way  into  idle  surplus,  it also  may  have  exacerbated  tenden- 
cies toward  displacement  as local governments  sought  to divert  funds  for 
meeting  nonwage  as well as wage  expenses. 
Targeting 
Under  existing  program  organization,  the number  of subsidized  slots  for 
temporary  public-service  employment  always  falls  short  of the demand  for 
them  by local governments  and individual  applicants.  This  imbalance  per- 
mits the use of special  allocation  criteria  to yield the greatest  social  value 
of the program.  In this section,  the actual geographic  and demographic 
aliocation  of jobs will be described. 
Given  the number  of jobs to be filled,  the social  value  of public  employ- 
ment is greater  (a) the greater  the output  from such  jobs, (b) the less the 
effect  of such  employment  on wages,  and  (c) the greater  the  benefits  to fam- 
ily welfare.  Measurement  of the output  of subsidized  public  employees  is 
subject  to ali the usual difficulties  encountered  in evaluating  government 
product.  The  impression  of outside  observers  is that typical  jobholders  do 
work similar  in content  and quality  to that performed  by other,  regular, 
public  employees;  but beyond  this little  can be said.33  Program  agents  can 
33. Levitan  and Taggart,  "An Overview,"  pp. 20-25. 92  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1976 
be expected  to take care of output  maximization,  since  this is likely  to be 
their  most  important  objective.  The  control  problem  is to devise  regulations 
or  incentives  so that  outcomes  will  also  reflect  the  importance  of the second 
and third  objectives. 
The appropriate  standard  for evaluation  of the inflationary  effect of 
public  employment  is not clear.  Not much  is known  about the nature  of 
the short-run  response  of wages to unemployment  within areas of the 
national  labor  market  or for specific  demographic  subgroups.  My analysis 
is based  on three  assumptions,  which  are  consistent  with  the  model  sketched 
at the beginning  of the paper.  The first  is that categories  like "workers  in 
Seattle"  and "workers  in Houston"  or "men"  and "women"  can, to some 
extent,  be viewed  as noncompeting  groups  in the  labor  market.  Second,  for 
such  groups  (or areas),  wages  respond  to the category's  employment  con- 
ditions  in a manner  similar  to the aggregate  (convex)  Phillips  relation  be- 
tween  rates  of wage  change  and  unemployment.  Moreover,  for a variety  of 
structural  reasons,  the "normal"  unemployment  rates  that  keep  labor  mar- 
kets in balance  will differ  among  categories.  Third,  all other  things  equal 
for each  category,  the slope of its sectoral  Phillips  curve  at a given  current 
unemployment  rate  will  be flatter  the  lower  the normal  unemployment  rate 
of that sector.  To put it another  way, a large  above-normal  component  of 
unemployment  is one indicator  of labor-market  slack,  associated  with less 
marginal  wage  pressure  from  incremental  employment. 
Two conclusions  follow from these assumptions:  (1) In the absence  of 
other considerations,  the inflation-minimizing  distribution  of public em- 
ployment  across  groups  will involve  a ratio of jobs created  to labor  force 
that is an increasing  function  of both their normal  unemployment  rates 
and their  recession-induced,  or above-normal,  unemployment  rates.  (2) So 
long as the "need"  for  jobs is related  to both the level and above-normal 
component  of unemployment  rates,  the allocation  of jobs on the basis of 
"need"  will not necessarily  conflict  with the anti-inflationary  objective.  I 
shall now apply  this analysis,  as well as other  relevant  considerations,  in 
evaluating  CETA  job allocation  across  geographic  labor  markets  and de- 
mographic  groups. 
THE DISTRIBUTION  ACROSS LOCAL LABOR MARKETS 
How  much  geographic  variation  in unemployment  rates  during  recession 
is actually  observed?  In table 3 I have listed the weighted  mean absolute Michael Wiseman  93 
Table  3. Dispersion  of Unemployment  Rates,  Nineteen  Major  Standard 
Metropolitan  Statistical  Areas,  1968-73  and  1975a 
National  unem- 
Year  Dispersion  indexb  ployment  rate 
1968  0.66  3.6 
1969  0.64  3.5 
1970  1.09  4.9 
1971  1.40  5.9 
1972  1.07  5.6 
1973  1.03  4.9 
1975  1.82  8.5 
Sources: Manpower  Report of the President, March 1972, and ibid., April 1974, tables A-1 and D-13 in 
each; and unpublished 1975 data furnished by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
a.  For the areas covered, see text note 34. 
b. Dispersion index: 
I LFi Ui  -  U 
I  LFi  Ui 
s-I 
2  LFi  1~~~~~~~~~1 
unemployment."s 
34. The SMSAs are San Francisco-Oakland,  Buffalo, Boston, Los Angeles-Long 
Beach, Detroit, New York, Pittsburgh,  Philadelphia,  St. Louis, Newark, Cincinnati, 
Minneapolis-St.  Paul, Houston, Washington,  Chicago, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Balti- 
more, and Dallas (which includes  Fort Worth in 1975). Figures  for 1968-72 are based 
on 1960  census  boundary  definitions;  those for 1973  and 1975  reflect  definitions  current 
in those years.  As a result,  the numbers  are not strictly  comparable,  but biases are likely 
to be very  small.  The measure  of dispersion  used  here  was first  proposed  by Robert  Aaron 
Gordon; see The  Goal  of Full  Employment  (Wiley, 1967),  p. 93. The 1975  unemployment 
rates have not been adjusted  for CETA  jobs. If these  jobs reduced  unemployment,  the 
results  that  follow  indicate  that dispersion  in 1975  would have  been  greater  in the absence 
of the program. 
35. For similar  results,  see Andrew  M. Sum and Thomas P. Rush, "The  Geographic 
Structure  of Unemployment  Rates," Monthly  Labor Review, vol. 98 (March 1975), 
pp. 3-9. Note the interesting  regularity  in table 3 in the relative  constancy of the 1:5 
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The  argument  for targeting  subsidized  public  employment  presumes  that 
such  expenditures  can  partially  offset  this  unevenness  in impact.  Given  the 
program's  modest  size,  such  an effect  is unlikely.  Rather,  I have  attempted 
to determine  whether  existing  allocation  rules  in fact produced  a positive 
relation  between  unemployment  rates  across  SMSAs  and  the ratio  of pub- 
lic-service  jobs to the  labor  force  for  each  area.  For  this  analysis,  I prepared 
a breakdown  of public-employment  jobs coincident  with the SMSA  data 
by sorting  employment  reports  of CETA  prime  sponsors  by SMSA and 
then  counting  across  prime  sponsors  to arrive  at figures  for subsidized  em- 
ployment  in each  metropolitan  area. 
Two  simple  tests  were  conducted  with  these  data.  The  first  demonstrated 
that  the geographical  distribution  of CETA  jobs (measured  relative  to the 
labor  force)  has been positively  associated  with differentials  in unemploy- 
ment rates.  Equation  4 reports  the results  of a regression  of the ratio of 
subsidized  jobs filled  in each of twenty-eight  SMSAs  in June 1975  to its 
average  monthly  labor  force  for that year  (the CETA rate) on its average 
adjusted  unemployment  rate  for 1975,  U7*.  The adjusted  rate  is formed  by 
adding  to the conventional  unemployment  rate the ratio of CETA  jobs 
to the average  monthly  labor force.36  In making  the latter  adjustment,  I 
have assumed  that every  CETA  job filled  by June  was associated  with a 
reduction  of one in average  annual  unemployment  in that SMSA.37  The 
coefficient  of the adjusted  unemployment  rate is positive  and statistically 
significant;  the negative  intercept  indicates  that the marginal  increase  in 
CETA  jobs associated  with a change  in unemployment  rates  is somewhat 
greater  than  the average  CETA  rate  for any  rate  of unemployment.  CETA 
employment  was, to a modest extent,  concentrated  in SMSAs  with high 
unemployment. 
(4)  CETA rate =-.  00018  +  0.0470 U75. 
(-1.95)  (4.93) 
R2  = 0.47; standard  error = 0.0012. 
Here and in the following equations,  the numbers  in parentheses  are 
t-statistics. 
36. In addition  to the nineteen  SMSAs cited in note 34, the sample  includes  Nassau- 
Suffolk (which was separated  from the New York SMSA in November 1972), Miami, 
Indianapolis,  Kansas City, Denver-Boulder,  Riverside-San  Bernardino-Ontario,  San 
Diego, San Jose, and Seattle-Everett.  Recent significant  boundary  changes prevented 
inclusion of Atlanta, the remaining  major SMSA for which unemployment  data from 
the CPS are available. 
37. This assumption  is probably  generous,  given the results  of the preceding  section 
as well as the possibility  of induced participation  effects.  But the results  of importance 
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The second  test gauges  the extent  to which  the allocation  of CETA  jobs 
was influenced  by the increment  in unemployment  rates associated  with 
the current  recession.  As is well  known,  various  structural  factors  generate 
substantial  and consistent  differentials  in unemployment  rates across 
metropolitan  areas.38  To measure  the extent  to which  actual  allocation  of 
public-employment  jobs responded  to the recession-induced  component  of 
unemployment,  a separate  regression  was  calculated  for twenty-six  SMSAs 
for  which  data  on the  unemployment  rate  were  available  for 1972-73  as well 
as 1975.  I assume  that  the  average  unemployment  rate  for  the earlier  period 
(U7273)  is a reasonable  proxy  for "normal"  unemployment  for  each  SMSA. 
It is included  along with a measure  of recession-induced  unemployment 
(the difference  between  the adjusted  unemployment  rate  in 1975,  U75, and 
this average)  as an independent  variable  in a regression  determining  the 
CETA  rate, defined  as for the previous  test. The results  are reported  in 
equation  5.39 
(5)  CETA rate =-  0.0023  +  0.0732  U7273  +  0.0199  (U75-  -  7273). 
(-  2.55)  (5.46)  (1.67) 
R2 = 0.59; standard  error = 0.001. 
Equation  5 indicates  that CETA job allocation across SMSAs was 
positively  associated  with cyclical  unemployment  differentials,  but the al- 
location  is principally  and  most reliably  associated  with  differences  in past 
average  unemployment. 
The correlation  between  changes in unemployment  rates  (adjusted  for 
CETA)  and the 1972-73  average  is almost  zero-  +0.04. Past unemploy- 
ment  differentials  did  not provide  a good clue  to the increase  in SMSA  un- 
employment  associated  with the current  recession.  Both CETA-II and 
CETA-VI  allocations  were based on levels of joblessness  during  three- 
month periods  in 1974. These results  suggest  that while the substantial 
correlation  between  levels  of unemployment  rates  across  years  assured  that 
cities with high rates in 1975 would get proportionately  more jobs, the 
allocation  mechanism  does  not concentrate  jobs in areas  disproportionately 
subjected  to cyclical joblessness.  If estimates  of local Phillips relations 
available  in the future  indicate  that the anti-inflationary  objective  can be 
enhanced  by making  job creation  more sensitive  to such cyclical  differen- 
tials, the job-allocation  procedures  used for CETA must be revamped. 
38. See Robert  E. Hall, "Why Is the Unemployment  Rate So High at Full Employ- 
ment?"  BPEA,  3:1970, pp. 375-84. 
39. Since data on program-agent  employment  were not available  for EEA, the un- 
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Since  the coefficient  of the cyclical  differential  term in equation  5 is so 
small,  my subjective  assessment  is that marginal  efforts  in this direction 
would  be quite  certain  to change  allocation;  and  I would  expect  the change 
to improve  the wage  effect  of public-employment  programs.40 
DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION 
The standard  for consideration  of labor-market  effects  of allocation  of 
jobs across  demographic  categories  of workers  will be similar  to that used 
above for evaluation  of the geographic  distribution.  In the analysis  of 
demographic  distribution,  the differences  among EEA, CETA-II, and 
CETA-VI  programs  can be used to identify  the response  of public em- 
ployers  to variations  in program  characteristics. 
Within  the broad  demographic  categories,  distinguishing  between  "low- 
skill"  and "high-skill"  groups  is difficult,  although  the Congressional  Bud- 
get Office  and  others  have  argued  that  concentration  of public  employment 
among  low-skilled  workers  would  minimize  the impact  of public  employ- 
ment on prices.4'  Other  things  equal, including  proportionate  changes  in 
unemployment  rates,  it is not clear  why this should  be true.  Since  markets 
for low-skilled  labor  may  be among  the most competitive  of all labor  mar- 
kets,  wages  there  will  presumably  react  most  promptly  to easing  or tighten- 
ing of labor  markets.  However,  to the extent  that low-skilled  workers  ex- 
perience  proportionately  more  joblessness  than do higher-skilled  groups, 
the criteria  advanced  earlier  indicate  that they should  benefit  more from 
employment  programs  in any event. 
The  effect  of subsidized  public  employment  on wages  in the  private  sector 
cannot  be assessed  only by its impact  on unemployment  rates.  If workers 
in public  jobs continue  active  search  for other  jobs because  their  wages  are 
low or  their  jobs are  certain  to be temporary,  they  may  exert  as much  down- 
ward  pressure  on wages  as they would if they were  jobless. The tradeoff 
between  impact on wage inflation  and impact on family  welfare  poses a 
paradox:  To minimize  inflationary  effects,  the best candidates  for $8,000 
40. It is possible that allocations under the CETA-VI  programs  were more closely 
associated with cyclical changes in unemployment  rates than is apparent from the 
analysis  of the combined  effect of CETA-II  and CETA-VI.  But the permitted  shifting 
of funds between programs  during  the spring of 1975 makes separate  analysis of the 
allocation  of CETA-VI  money impossible. 
41. See Congressional  Budget  Office,  Temporary  Measures  to Stimulate  Employment, 
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jobs may be workers  who would normally  make $12,000.  To maximize 
family  welfare,  the optimum  candidate  for such a job may be the man or 
woman  who has never  earned  more  than $7,000. 
While wages  in public-employment  jobs average  about $8,000  a year, 
available  evidence  indicates  that  they  vary  with  demographic  characteristics 
in the same  way that  wages  do in the private  labor  market:  young  people, 
members  of minority  groups,  those  with  relatively  little education,  and fe- 
males  tend  to occupy  lower-paying  jobs.42  Because  of this correlation,  it is 
difficult  to draw  inferences  about  alternatives  available  to participants  on 
the basis  of their  personal  characteristics  alone. In other  words,  a former 
welfare  recipient  in a CETA  job may be looking  for something  else  just as 
intensely  as is a college  graduate. 
Data on turnover  of participants  in EEA  programs  do not reveal  system- 
atic differences  between  demographic  classes of workers  that can be re- 
lated  to intensity  of search  for employment  alternatives.43  Since  the dura- 
tion of subsidized  jobs is rarely  specified  in advance,  search  is retarded 
by the possibility  that such  jobs will continue  for extended  periods,  and, 
at least for EEA and in the early  stages  of CETA,  by the emphasis  placed 
on transition  to regular  government  employment.44 
Given  this  lack  of information  on wage  effects,  I concentrate  here  on the 
relation  between  unemployment  rates  and  job allocation  under  CETA.  In 
table  4, 1975  unemployment  rates,  the change  in unemployment  rates  be- 
tween 1974  and 1975,  and CETA  employment  as a percent  of labor  force 
and of the change  in unemployment  are reported  for workers  in various 
demographic  categories.  Unemployment  rates  are  reported  for  March  1975, 
approximately  the  midpoint  of the period  of public-employment  expansion 
42. Westat,  Inc.,  Longitudinal  Evaluation  of the  Public  Employment  Program  and Vali- 
dation  of the  PEP Data Banik:  Final  Report  (Westat, 1975), p. 5-18. 
43. Ibid., pp. 5-20 to 5-26. Young workers  tended to terminate  EEA employment 
quickly,  but it is possible  that the jobs provided  members  of this group  were of particu- 
larly short duration. 
44. Most public-service  jobs are linked  to entry  positions  on civil service  employment 
ladders.  Such  a job gives  its holder  an edge in competition  for regular  slots as they open. 
Since  steady  salary  growth  and stability  are still associated  with such  jobs in most areas, 
this edge is an important  fringe  benefit.  In its study  of high-impact  demonstration  public 
employment  under  EEA, the National Planning  Association  found that "cyclically  un- 
employed"  workers  (those with a college education  or who had experienced  a wage cut 
in taking  subsidized  employment)  earned  relatively  high wages while in subsidized  jobs 
and nonetheless  generally  moved quickly back to unsubsidized  jobs. But for most of 
this group, "unsubsidized"  jobs were regular  jobs in state and local government.  See 
National  Planning  Association,  Evaluation  of the Economic  Impact  Project,  vol. 1, p. 95. 98  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1976 
Table 4.  Unemployment  Rates and CETA Employment, 
by Demographic  Category, 1974-75 
Change  in 
nzemployment  CETA  emnployment,  Marc/h  1975 
rate, 
Unemployment  March  1974 to  As a 
rate,  March  1975  As a  percent  of 
March  1975  (percentage  percent  of  change  in 
Category  (percent)  points)  labor  force  unemployment 
Age 
16-21  19.8  6.4  0.42  6.5 
22-44  8.9  4.4  0.33  7.1 
45-54  6.0  2.9  0.12  4.3 
55 and over  5.4  2.4  0.08  3.5 
Sex 
Male  9.2  4.4  0.30  6.8 
Female  9.7  3.7  0.21  5.5 
Race 
White  8.7  3.9  0.20  5.1 
Nonwhite  15.3  6.0  0.76  12.6 
Education 
8 years or less  12.0  5.9  0.20  3.6 
9-11 years  15.5  5.9  0.28  4.9 
12 years  9.4  4.6  0.29  6.1 
Morethan 12years  5.2  2.1  0.25  11.4 
Sources: Unemployment and labor-force participation  data, by age, race, and sex, are from Employment 
antd  Earnings,  vo!. 20 (April 1974), and vol. 21 (April 1975). Unemployment and labor-force participation 
by education for March 1974 are from Beverly J. McEaddy, Educational  Attainment  of  Workers,  March 
1974, Special Labor Force Report 175 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1975), table B. Data for 1975 were 
furnished by Division of Labor Force Studies, BLS. CETA employment rates were calculated from un- 
published data supplied by U.S.  Department of  Labor, Employment and Training Administration. All 
unemployment figures  are adjusted to include CETA jobs. 
under  CETA  and  the only  month  for which  data  on education  of the labor 
force  is available.  As was  the  case  for  the SMSA  data  used  in the  regression 
reported  earlier,  the estimates  for the unemployment  rate in 1975  are ad- 
justed  to include  CETA  jobholders.  The CETA  rate  is the ratio of CETA 
jobs filled  as of March  1975  to the labor  force  in each  category.45  It is the 
45. The estimate  is made by multiplying  the ratio of the cumulative  number  of job- 
holders in each classification  to total CETA employment  through June 1975 by the 
number  of CETA  jobs filled  at the end of March.  This estimate  is subject  to two sources 
of error:  (1) employment  in March  may not have had the same composition  as that for 
earlier  or later  months; (2) the demographic  data are cumulative  and are biased toward 
overstatement  of the CETA impact  on high-turnover  groups. Michael  Wiseman  99 
demographic  analogue  of the  rate  employed  earlier  in this  section  for  labor- 
market  data. 
No adjustment  is made  in the table  to take  account  of changes  in labor- 
force  participation  of the various  demographic  groups  that  occurred  as the 
overall  employment  picture  grew  more dismal.  Measured  changes  in un- 
employment  rates  are affected  by those changes  and may mask  the distri- 
butional  effect  of the recession.  However,  I found no satisfactory  way to 
eliminate  the recession's  discouraged-worker  effect;  the experimental  ad- 
justments  that  I tried  had  only  negligible  effects  on the results  shown  in the 
table. 
Several  aspects  of CETA  job creation  are  apparent  from  the table.  First, 
the program  is small. For no category  is the CETA rate substantial;  it 
amounts  to less than 1 percent  for all categories  and exceeds  one-half  of 
1 percent  only for nonwhites.  Second,  the incidence  of CETA  across  cate- 
gories  has been broadly  consistent  with the desirable  pattern  relative  to 
levels  and  changes  in unemployment  rates.  Although  women  received  pro- 
portionately  fewer  jobs than  men,  this  is at least  in part  consistent  with  the 
greater  increase  in male  joblessness,  as is seen in the last column of the 
table.  The  underrepresentation  of workers  with  little  education  is not con- 
sistent  with appropriate  targeting,  in terms  of the level or change  of their 
unemployment.  On the other hand, people with less than a high school 
education  are  heavily  represented  in CETA  training  programs.  Public  jobs 
need  not be the appropriate  policy  for all workers  during  a recession. 
Perhaps  the  most impressive  characteristic  of public-employment  alloca- 
tion  under  CETA  is the  substantial  concentration  on minority  employment. 
Apparently,  approximately  one-eighth  of all incremental  unemployment 
occurring  among  nonwhites  between  March  1974  and  March  1975  was ab- 
sorbed  by public  jobs. This estimate  is sensitive  to errors  in estimation  of 
nonwhite  unemployment  rates, unknown  induced  changes  in labor-force 
participation,  and  the assumption  made  about  the effect  of CETA  jobs on 
measured  unemployment.  The impression,  however,  is robust  with  respect 
to all reasonable  alternative  assumptions:  considering  the size of the pro- 
gram,  CETA  has had a substantial  effect  on minority  employment. 
The same is true for workers  with some college education.  While the 
unemployment  rate  for this group  in March  1975  was roughly  half  that of 
workers  with only a high-school  background  (and had risen only half as 
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one-ninth  of all recession  unemployment  among  college-educated  workers 
was absorbed  by CETA. 
The concentration  on minority  employment  was greater  under  the early 
CETA-II  program,  as the  result  of its special  targeting  provisions.  The  con- 
centration  was eroded  during  the press for employment  expansion  that 
began  in January  of 1975.  Table  5 reports  the demographic  composition  of 
cumulative  employment  under  EEA and the two CETA  programs.  Char- 
acteristics  for CETA-II  participants  are separately  reported  for those 
employed  in 1974  and those employed  in 1975. Compared  to EEA, the 
CETA-II  program  during  the fall of 1974  reached  proportionately  more 
young,  female,  less  well-educated,  and  nonwhite  workers.  But  employment 
under  CETA-VI  proved  to be similar  in composition  to employment  under 
EEA.  While  CETA-II  employment  continued  to be more  focused  on non- 
whites  and women  than was the case for CETA-VI,  the composition  of 
employment  shifted  substantially  in 1975  to better-educated  workers.  By 
June,  overall  employment  in CETA  looked much  like employment  under 
EEA. The type of targeting  imposed  by the allocation  rules  for CETA-Il 
did initially  concentrate  jobs among  a population  different  from  that from 
which  EEA  employment  was  drawn,  but apparently,  as noted  above,  at the 
cost of delaying  implementation. 
The aggregated  public-employment  figures  may disguise  improvement 
over time in allocation  within each category  of jobs toward  persons  in 
severe  need. Employment  of former  public-assistance  recipients  and dis- 
advantaged  persons  is greater  under  CETA  than was the case for EEA. 
Public-assistance  recipients  constituted  approximately  15 percent of all 
CETA  hires  through  June 1975,  up from 12 percent  of initial  employees 
under  EEA. About 46 percent  of persons  hired  under  CETA  public-em- 
ployment  programs  were classed  as "economically  disadvantaged"  com- 
pared  with  less than  40 percent  for EEA,  although  that  may  reflect  the fact 
that  the current  criterion  for "economically  disadvantaged"  is less  rigorous 
than  the one applied  for EEA.48  For workers  in newly  formed  households, 
the criterion  is difficult  to apply  and the actual  procedure  followed  at the 
local level is a matter  of considerable  uncertainty. 
46. Currently,  a person is deemed disadvantaged  if he or she lives in a family that 
receives  cash welfare payments  or with income during  the preceding  year that is less 
than the Office  of Management  and Budget-Orshansky  poverty  thresholds.  See Federal 
Register  (March 19, 1974), p. 10376. For EEA, additional  age, race, and educational 
qualifications  were  employed.  See Manpower  Report  of the  President,  March  1973,  p. 54. Michael  Wiseman  101 
Table 5.  Composition  of Employment  under  Major Public-Employment 
Programs, by Demographic  Category, Various  Periods, 1971-75 
Percent 
Comprehensive  Training  and  Employment  Act 
Emer-  Title  II  Titles  II 
gency  Title VI,  and VI, 
Employ-  July  January  January  July 
ment  1974 to  1975  1975  1974 
Act to  December  to June  to June  to June 
Category  June 1972  1974  1975  1975  1975 
Age 
21 or under  20  22.9  24.1  21.4  22.7 
22-44  65  62.6  63.0  64.8  63.7 
45-54  10  9.4  8.0  9.1  8.7 
55 and over  5  5.1  4.9  4.7  4.8 
Sex 
Male  72  64.8  66.1  70.2  67.7 
Female  28  35.2  33.9  29.8  32.3 
Race 
White  71  63.8  65.7  71.1  67.7 
Nonwhite  29  36.2  34.3  28.9  32.3 
Education 
8 years  or less\  27  9.4  9.3  8.4  8.9 
9-11 years  f  20.1  17.5  18.2  18.3 
12 years  43  44.1  41.9  43.7  43.1 
More than 12 years  31  26.4  31.2  29.6  29.7 
Souree: Unpublished program data furnished by U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training 
Administration. Figures are rounded. 
Over 90 percent of  EEA  participants were reported as  having been 
unemployed at the time of program entry. More than half of these people 
claimed to have been jobless for more than fifteen weeks at the time they 
were hired. Similar numbers are reported for CETA, although the data 
are somewhat distorted by the presence of some EEA carryovers, all of 
whom were "employed" prior to moving to CETA rolls. These numbers 
are highly suspect. A national survey of EEA participants  conducted during 
1972 and 1973 revealed that over a fifth of the employees interviewed had 
been employed on the day prior to accession to a subsidized job.47  If the 
figures on previous employment are this unreliable, there is no reason to 
47. Westat,  Inc., Longitudinal  Evaluation  of thePublic  Employment  Program,  pp.  4-5  to 
4-7. The same  survey  confirmed  the accuracy  of the characteristics  data  employed  earlier. 102  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1976 
believe  those for duration.  Since  the basic procedures  for hiring  were  no 
different  for EEA and CETA,  there  is no reason  to believe  that the ac- 
curacy  of the data  has improved. 
Perhaps,  an unemployment  criterion  for admission  is not critical  to the 
effectiveness  of public  employment,  since, when leaving  for a subsidized 
job, a previously  employed  worker  vacates  one  job which  presumably  can 
be filled  by another  person.  But  good  political  and  economic  reasons  argue 
for retaining  that  criterion.  To the public,  it sounds  right  to limit  such  jobs 
to the  jobless. Such  a limitation  also avoids  creation  of vacancies  which, 
even though  ultimately  filled,  will raise  unemployment  temporarily.  A re- 
quirement  that a public-service  employee  must have been unemployed 
serves  to rotate  the "job"  of search  for employment  and the social  burden 
of restraining  inflation  among a larger  group of workers.  To a modest 
extent,  this  criterion  may  improve  the  distribution  of income  resulting  from 
the program.  These  factors  suggest  that the longer  the duration  of unem- 
ployment  required  as a condition  of public  employment  the  better.  The  cost 
of these  improvements  is that, as the duration  requirement  is lengthened, 
search  costs for the employer  multiply  and speed  of job creation  declines. 
Only  14  percent  of unemployed  enrollees  in CETA  report  that  they  were 
receiving  unemployment  insurance  benefits  at the time  of program  entry.48 
The low figure  is a puzzle.  During  the first  half of 1975,  about  two-thirds 
of all unemployment  was insured  in one form or another.  Since  there  are 
few incentives  for underreporting-receipt  of benefits  presumably  con- 
firms  unemployment-perhaps  new labor-force  entrants  are more exten- 
sively  represented  in CETA  than  the official  data  imply  or the  program  has 
succeeded  in picking  exhaustees,  workers  formerly  employed  in uncovered 
jobs, or those  jobless  for only  a very  short  period  (though  the last explana- 
tion is inconsistent  with the long duration  of unemployment  reported  by 
program  jobholders). 
SUMMARY 
Among  the metropolitan  areas  used  for analysis  here,  CETA  public  em- 
ployment  was closely related  to levels of unemployment  rates but only 
weakly  to cyclical  increases  in unemployment  rates. Since  the geographic 
48. This number is  derived from unpublished  tabulations of  CETA participant 
characteristics  furnished by U.S.  Department of Labor, Employment  and Training 
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dispersion  of unemployment  rates  declines  during  economic  recovery,  all 
stimulative  policies  will  reduce  dispersion.  Apparently,  however,  public  em- 
ployment  performs  better  than the average  in this respect. 
Nor did  I find  direct  evidence  that  public  employment  is concentrated  on 
workers  from  disadvantaged  households.  While  there  is a high concentra- 
tion among  minority  groups,  there  is an especially  small  participation  of 
low-education  groups.  Survey  data suggest  that the degree  to which  such 
jobs go to persons  who have  suffered  from  extended  joblessness  is exagger- 
ated.  Under  existing  programs,  program  agents  have  little  incentive  to seek 
out such  workers  or to be concerned  about the reliability  of information 
that is collected  on worker  poverty  or on employment  status.  Tlherefore, 
this  result  is probably  not surprising.  Few CETA  jobholders  report  receiv- 
ing unemployment  insurance  immediately  prior  to obtaining  their  CETA 
jobs. In general,  there  is no evidence  to support  the contention  that the 
type of workers  hired  through  public-employment  programs  means a re- 
duction  in payments  of unemployment-insurance  benefits  or in other  gov- 
ernment  transfers,  or an increase  in tax collections  beyond that which 
occurs  whenever  employment  expands. 
Conclusions  for Improving  Public  Employment 
Since  I have already  summarized  my findings  on implementation,  dis- 
placement,  and targeting,  my final remarks  deal with improvements  that 
might  be incorporated  into any  future  antirecessionary  public-employment 
program. 
The  big virtues  of existing  public-employment  procedures  are  speed  and 
job impact.  Reforms  should  be sought  that improve  the other  qualities  of 
the program  while sacrificing  as little of these virtues as possible. Five 
changes  can be expected  to improve  the impact  of the program: 
First, add to the collection  of rules for job allocation  one specifically 
based on the excess of current  unemployment  rates above past averages 
for each  labor  market. 
Second,  augment  the  program  with  some  type  of countercyclical  revenue 
sharing.  Present  procedures  implicitly  require  local governments  to cut 
taxes  or reduce  expenditures  on regular  functions  in order  to undertake  the 
stabilization  function appropriately  borne by Washington.  Increasing 
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Even  with  this added  support,  however,  public  employment  cannot  allevi- 
ate the "fiscal  crisis"  of the older  central  cities,  and should  not be used in 
an attempt  to "save"  New York or Detroit.  There  surely  are better  tools 
for implementing  a public-policy  goal of reversing  the secular  decline  of 
the nation's  central  cities. 
Third,  limit  jobholders  in a countercyclical  program  to a fixed tenure. 
My preference  is for a one-year  tenure.  This procedure  has several  advan- 
tages.  First,  it would  placejobs  under  review  for  maintenance  of effort  on an 
annual  basis rather  than at initiation  only. Second, fixed tenure  would 
create  incentives  for public  jobholders  to continue  search  for regular  em- 
ployment  alternatives.  Third,  fixed  tenure  would  permit  a countercyclical 
public-employment  program  to be closed  within  a year.  It is essential  that 
persons  unable  to find  alternative  employment  after  tenure  as special  public 
employees  be given  assistance  in job search,  training,  and unemployment 
benefits  as appropriate. 
Fourth,  maintain  during  recession  the classroom  and  on-the-job  training 
programs  that are the normal  activity  of the local prime sponsors.  The 
population  served  by these  programs  is more  uniformly  disadvantaged  than 
is that served  by public  employment.  Substituting  countercyclical  employ- 
ment  for  these  activities  has  adverse  distributional  consequences  and  should 
be avoided. 
Fifth, remove  the certification  procedure  for public-employment  eligi- 
bility  to a separate  agency  that has contact  with the entire  eligible  group. 
The  process  of sifting  applicants  for those  who are  eligible  takes  time;  and 
the more  complicated  the eligibility  criteria  applied,  the longer  the time  in- 
volved. State  employment  services  have the advantage  of a more general 
perspective  on the labor force,  files of potential  jobholders  that could be 
rapidly  scanned  for the eligible,  and superior  information  on duration  of 
employment,  and are the logical  candidates  for this function. Comments  and 
Discussion 
R. A. Gordon:  Wiseman's  evaluation  of American  experience  with  public- 
service  employment  during  the last five years  is a welcome  addition  to a 
growing  literature.  It is carefully  done;  the  relevant  literature  and  data  have 
been reviewed;  on the whole, the important  issues are covered;  and the 
various  topics considered  are treated  with analytical  sophistication.  The 
section  on lags in the implementation  of public-service  employment  pro- 
grams  is especially  well  done,  and  I found  it very  informative.  In particular, 
I had not thought  very much about the problems  involved  in closing  out 
a program  as unemployment  falls. 
Yet, I must  confess  to a certain  disappointment  when  I had  finished  read- 
ing  the  paper.  In much  of it, Wiseman  largely  confines  himself  to reviewing 
and evaluating  the work of others.  Only in the last empirical  section,  on 
"targeting,"  does he introduce  any significant  amount  of new data on his 
own. I am sorry  that he did not choose  to make  use of other  data that he 
has compiled  that might  have thrown  additional  light on a complex  and 
controversial  subject. 
Wiseman  considers  public-service  employment  only in terms  of its pos- 
sible role in coping  with a cyclical  rise in unemployment.  This emphasis 
leads him in his concluding  recommendations  to propose  that public-ser- 
vice  employment  be limited  to a fixed  tenure  that "would  permit  a counter- 
cyclical  ...  program  to be closed  within  a year."  Other  types  of manpower 
programs  and  unemployment  benefits  would  have  to take  care  of those  who 
cannot  find  a job after  their  limited  period  of employment  in the program. 
As Wiseman  recognizes,  some economists  have advocated  a "two-tier" 
program,  consisting  of (1) a triggered,  cyclical  program  such  as he is con- 
cerned  with, and (2) a permanent  program  to deal with the structurally 
disadvantaged.  I should  like to be on record  as favoring  such a two-tier 
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program.  A full consideration  of the possible  contributions  that public- 
service  employment  can make  to reducing  the average  level of unemploy- 
ment  in the United  States  over a decade  or more  requires  consideration  of 
what  it might  contribute  to the employment  and  training  of the structurally 
underprivileged. 
Now for  a few  comments  on particular  points  in Wiseman's  presentation. 
First,  the author  frequently  refers  to the goal of returning  to a "normal" 
unemployment  rate,  and early  in his paper  he refers  to "normal"  or "full- 
employment  rates"  as synonymous.  It would  be helpful  to know what  he 
means  by "normal"  or "full"  employment  in the latter  half of the 1970s. 
Does he mean  an overall  unemployment  rate  in the range  of 4 to 5 percent, 
with the implication  that a public-service  employment  program,  on what- 
ever  scale,  is not to be reduced  until  the  upper  limit  of this  range  is reached? 
If so, an opportunity  to terminate  or even reduce  the present  program  is 
hardly  likely  for quite  a while. 
One of the most vigorously  debated  issues in the literature  on public- 
service  employment  concerns  the amount  of leakage-what Wiseman  calls 
displacement.  Here, Wiseman  does an excellent  and unusually  thorough 
job in evaluating  the main studies  that have been made of this problem. 
He reaches  rather  negative  conclusions  that  stress  lack  of reliable  estimates 
of the displacement  effect.  If that is the case, how might we make more 
reliable  estimates? 
The section  on targeting  raises  a range  of questions.  One  has to do with 
the author's  concern  regarding  the possible  inflationary  effects  of an in- 
crease  in the demand  for labor  through  public-service  employment.  He as- 
sumes  that  the inflationary  effect  will  be minimized  if these  jobs are  distrib- 
uted geographically  in a way that emphasizes  the change  in local unem- 
ployment  above  prerecession  levels. I think a good case can be made  for 
using the level of unemployment  as a primary  criterion.  I am not even 
convinced  that changes  in unemployment  rates  deserve  to be treated  as a 
separate,  additional,  criterion.  In any event,  the existing  and any foresee- 
able public-service  employment  programs  are too small to stir concern 
about  significant  inflationary  effects. 
The  author  provides  a careful  and  very  useful  analysis  of the distribution 
of public-service  jobs by age, sex, race,  and education.  This analysis  leads 
to a mixed  set of conclusions:  "While  there  is a high concentration  among 
minority  groups,  there  is an especially  small  participation  of low-education 
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Wiseman  concludes  with a number  of recommendations.  I am afraid  I 
have  to disagree  with  two of them.  First,  as I have already  indicated,  I am 
not convinced  that  the geographical  allocation  of jobs should  be geared  to 
changes  in unemployment,  rather  than just the level of unemployment. 
And, second,  fixed  and limited  tenure  of public-service  jobs is much too 
harsh  and  inflexible  a rule  for  my taste.  This  criticism  brings  me back  to the 
point  I have  already  made.  We need  a two-tier  program  that will take  care 
of the structurally  disadvantaged  as well as those  temporarily  unemployed 
during  a short  recession. 
But  despite  my criticisms  on particular  points,  let me conclude  by repeat- 
ing that Wiseman  has presented  us with a probing  and useful  analysis  of 
our  recent  experience  with  public-service  employment. 
James  Tobin:  I see three  major  sets of criteria  against  which  public-service 
employment  programs  might  be evaluated.  First,  they  might  be considered 
as distributive  and  allocative  policies,  with  micro  rather  than  macro  impli- 
cations.  One question,  from  this perspective,  is whether  the programs  im- 
prove  equity  in the distribution  of income  and of jobs. The distribution  of 
employment  and unemployment  seems  quite  unfair  to many  citizens,  and 
they might want to alter it regardless  of macroeconomic  consequences. 
Another  question  is the value of the social  product  from  putting  people  to 
work on these programs-for example,  beautifying  New York City. A 
third aspect  might reflect  a moral preference  for people working  rather 
than receiving  transfer  payments without working. In considering  the 
range  of issues  associated  with  public-service  employment,  some attention 
to these micro issues seems desirable;  they are completely  ignored in 
Wiseman's  paper. 
A second  major  set of criteria  would  view  public-service  employment  as 
a measure  of fiscal  policy, stressing  the size of its multiplier,  its quantum 
of bang  for a buck.  Wiseman  devotes  considerable  attention  to this ques- 
tion; for example,  the displacement  issue  that occupies  much  of the paper 
is purely  a matter  of the size of the multiplier.  The  multiplier  can  be viewed 
in terms  of employment  created  either  per dollar  of government  expendi- 
ture  or per dollar  of federal  deficit.  The  latter  is less interesting  to me, but 
may  be important,  insofar  as people  worry  about  the deficit.  But  the whole 
question  is overstressed.  We do not lack  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  instru- 
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programs  result  in more  jobs per  dollar  than  tax  cuts or monetary  ease,  the 
difference  is only  in the  first  round  of the  multiplier  process  and  will  survive 
only if other  macro  policies  are accommodative. 
The  third  set of criteria  concerns  the  usefulness  of public-service  employ- 
ment as a measure  for improving  the Phillips-curve  tradeoff  between  in- 
flation  and  unemployment  and lowering  the nonaccelerating-inflation  rate 
of unemployment.  To me, this is the most important  issue from  the point 
of view  of macroeconomic  policy;  yet Wiseman  gives  it less attention  than 
the multiplier  issue, and sometimes  does not clearly  distinguish  between 
the two. 
There  are several  ways in which  public-service  employment  might  im- 
prove  the tradeoff.  One of these  mechanisms  hinges  on the point  made  by 
George  Perry  that  the  rate  of wage  increase  of individual  workers  influences 
economy-wide  wage inflation  with weights  that are proportional  to the 
shares  of individual  workers  in the aggregate  wage  bill; thus, a given  rate 
of wage  inflation  for  low-wage  workers  has  less  aggregate  effect  than  would 
the  same  rate  for  high-wage  workers.  On  the other  hand,  individual  workers 
are  equal  in the count  of unemployment;  one can infer  that,  in at least one 
dimension  of our social-welfare  function,  unemployed  people get equal 
weights  rather  than  wage  weights.  By that  standard,  it becomes  possible  to 
increase  welfare  by concentrating  employment  gains  on low-wage  workers. 
Public-service  employment  programs  could accomplish  this in principle, 
whether  they  actually  do or not. Of course,  if the contribution  of reducing 
unemployment  to social welfare  is merely  a proxy for the associated  in- 
crease  in output-the Okun's  law  relationship  between  unemployment  and 
output-then a redistribution  of employment  in favor  of low-wage  workers 
does not improve  social welfare  since,  presumably,  the increase  in output 
is proportional  to the wage of the employee  and not merely  to the count 
of heads. 
Second,  public-employment  programs  may improve  the tradeoff  by hir- 
ing people who are on relatively  flat segments  of their sectoral  Phillips 
curves.  Added  employment  for  such  groups  would  tighten  the  labor  market 
less than would  the same gain in employment  achieved  from the normal 
mixture  of  jobs associated  with  expansion  of aggregate  demand.  There  may 
be large  differences  in the slopes of sectoral  Phillips  curves  at any overall 
unemployment  rate. In practice,  this consideration  probably  leads to the 
same focus on low-wage  jobs and on unskilled  workers  as the first  con- 
sideration.  For example,  when  the  job market  for skilled  prime-age  males 
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ginal tightening there from a given increase in employment would then be 
much smaller. 
Wiseman's findings indicate that actual public-employment programs 
have not taken much advantage of this possibility of focusing employment 
on labor markets with flat Phillips curves. In evaluating that issue, Wise- 
man looks particularly  at the excess of the unemployment rate in any city 
or for any group above its previous "prosperity" level; that assumes that 
those groups whose unemployment has increased the most during the re- 
cession are the ones that are on the flatter segments of the Phillips curve. 
I question that assumption, and would suggest that the recession level of 
unemployment might be a better gauge for that purpose than the increase. 
And, as Wiseman recognizes, the programs would get a better grade for 
allocating jobs among cities by the level criterion. 
Still a third improvement in the tradeoff, which Wiseman mentions, re- 
lates to the possibility that workers in public-employment programs may 
be more active in seeking other jobs  than would people employed else- 
where. If they are sufficiently  active, they may be restraining  wage inflation 
almost as much as if they were fully unemployed. This is likely to be true 
if the beneficiaries  of public-service programs perceive their jobs as lower 
in wage and status and more transient than regular  jobs. Presumably that 
is the point to Arthur Burns' proposal that employer-of-last-resort jobs 
pay wages below the current standard minimum wage and to Wiseman's 
proposal for limiting the tenure of public-employment jobs. 
I have tried to sketch a simple algebraic framework for thinking about 
these matters. In this model, wage inflation is related both to vacancies and 
to  unemployment, naturally with opposite signs. Normally,  when addi- 
tional jobs are created, vacancies also increase and hence it takes more than 
100 newly created jobs (or job slots) to produce a net increase of 100 in 
actual employment (or filled  jobs). The model (displayed on the next page) 
also includes the usual induced effect on the supply of labor, which I take 
to depend on the number of jobs, including vacancies as well as filled  jobs. 
In the model, 
U  =  unemployment 
S  =  labor  supply 
E  =  employment 
J  = jobs 
W =  wage-inflation  rate 
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In the framework  of this model, public-service  employment  can con- 
ceivably  improve  the tradeoff  (lower the absolute  value of x) in several 
ways.  One  would  be by diminishing  the number  of extra  vacancies  that go 
along  with  additional  jobs or additional  employment  (raising  EJ). If vacan- 
cies rise to a lesser  extent  for a given amount  of additional  employment, 
then  the economy  would  not experience  so much  additional  wage  pressure. 
The  best  program  of all would  find  a way  to fill existing  vacancies  with  un- 
employed  workers.  Public-service  employment  programs  can't  be expected 
to do that,  but they  may  be able  to keep  job creation  geared  closely  to jobs 
filled  without  producing  extra  vacancies.  They  may also be associated  with 
a particularly  small  induced  labor-supply  effect  (that  is, a low Si) because 
of their  selective  and  transient  nature;  some  people  who  are  out of the  labor 
force  might  not be eligible  for such  jobs and others  might  not be attracted 
to them.  Finally,  by the right  selective  measures,  the programs  might  con- 
ceivably  improve  the disciplining  effect  of unemployment  on wage  inflation 
(increasing  the absolute  value  of qu). Some  of the characteristics  of public- 
service  employment  programs  that might be desirable  for improving  the 
Phillips  curve  would  be undesirable  on the basis of other  criteria.  For ex- 
ample,  transient  jobs may not be  jobs of high  social  productivity,  may not 
build human  capital or motivate  careers.  Similarly,  the best techniques 
for minimizing  wage inflation  may not serve  criteria  of equity  and need. 
Some of these  considerations  lead me to wonder  whether  a program  that 
placed  eligible  workers  into private  or public  jobs with  a federal  wage  sub- 
sidy  might  not be a better  device  for balancing  several  objectives  than are 
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General  Discussion 
A number  of participants  probed  further  into the problem  of assessing 
the multiple  objectives  of public-employment  programs  as set forth by 
Wiseman  and  elaborated  by Tobin.  It was  generally  agreed  that  the success 
of antirecession  policy  could  not be gauged  solely  by its effect  on the mea- 
sured  unemployment  rate. Arthur  Okun pointed out that, if the nation 
wanted  merely  to reduce  reported  unemployment,  there  would be trivial 
(and  actually  perverse)  ways  to accomplish  that aim-for example,  requir- 
ing recipients  of unemployment  insurance  not to seek work so that they 
would be counted  as being out of the labor force rather  than as unem- 
ployed.  He felt, along with Tobin, that gains in real income  and output 
were  the main  objectives.  Robert  J. Gordon  noted,  however,  that the dis- 
tribution  of the real income  lost during  recession  was a source  of social 
concern;  hence, measures  that might share the burden  more equitably 
would be attractive  quite apart from their effects on total real income. 
Robert  A. Gordon  stressed  that  the number  of people  out of work  against 
their will in and of itself detracted  from his concept of social welfare. 
William  Poole linked  this consideration  to the personal  satisfactions  that 
people  get out of having  jobs and contributing  to the social product.  He 
noted that this value of employment  gets perverted  in proposals  to force 
people into unattractive  "workfare"  jobs, or work-conditioned  income 
maintenance,  as a way of getting  them  off welfare  rolls. 
Christopher  Sims generalized  the issues raised in this discussion;  he 
pointed  out that the welfare  evaluation  of unemployment  depended  upon 
the usual  correlations  of unemployment  with  other  variables-the produc- 
tivity of workers,  their satisfaction  with jobs, participation  in the labor 
force,  and the like. To the extent  that these  relations  are altered  by a par- 
ticular  kind  of employment  program,  the social  significance  of unemploy- 
ment  is changed.  For example,  if in fact  the programs  that  Wiseman  evalu- 
ated  were  less effective  in attracting  people  into the labor  force  than other 
kinds  of employment  were,  this may  be an advantage  in holding  down  the 
unemployment  number;  but  it may  be a disadvantage  in terms  of effects  on 
output  and the efficiency  of allocation.  William  Feltner  inferred  the need 
for an educational  effort  to persuade  the public  to pay less attention  to the 
measured  unemployment  rate  and  more  attention  to the benefits  and  costs 
that various  programs  offer  to nonworkers,  whether  they are categorized 
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There  was  further  discussion  of the criteria  by which  jobs could be tar- 
geted  to minimize  inflationary  impacts.  Nobody  contested  Wiseman's  judg- 
ment  that  the "normal"  unemployment  rate  of a given  geographical,  occu- 
pational,  or demographic  labor  market  is one indicator  of that market's 
ability  to digest  a relatively  large increment  of jobs in a noninflationary 
way.  But  James  Tobin  reiterated  his warning  against  assuming  that  all  labor 
markets  had Phillips  curves  with  the same  slopes  at their  "normal"  unem- 
ployment  rates. Charles  Holt shared  R. A. Gordon's  feeling that these 
targeting  issues  were  not of great  significance  for small  programs  like the 
recent  CETA  efforts;  but he judged  that they could be critical  in the con- 
text of larger,  permanent  structural  programs  of job creation.  Michael 
Wachter  interpreted  the  absence  of sound  criteria  for  targeting  or  triggering 
as a distinct  general  defect  of countercyclical  public-service  programs.  He 
was also concerned  that  job creation  in the public  sector  might be espe- 
cially  inflationary  because  the state and local sector  had been marked  by 
such  a strong  spiral  of wage  inflation  prior  to the recession. 
Wachter  was  also skeptical  about  the productivity  of public-service  jobs, 
in part because  they were so temporary,  and in part because  they repre- 
sented  an inflow  of low-skilled  workers  into a sector  that has rather  high- 
skill  job requirements.  Edward  Gramlich  underlined  the fact that  the aver- 
age education  of state  and local employees  was far above  that of workers 
in general;  hence, Wiseman's  finding  that CETA misses undereducated 
workers  should  not be surprising.  George  Perry  noted that idle capital  in 
recession  was  concentrated  in the  private  sector;  he saw  that  as one reason 
to prefer  the  creation  of private  jobs whereby  capital  as well  as labor  would 
be put to work. Holt cautioned  Wachter  and others  not to assume  that 
short-term  jobs were  low-productivity  jobs relative  to the wages  they  paid; 
he stressed  that job tenure  throughout  the economy averages  only two 
years  roughly.  Robert  Solow  suggested  that,  if  state  and  local  administrators 
are  given  an incentive  to hire  lower-skilled  workers,  they  are  likely  to make 
adjustments  in that direction.  Wiseman  supported  that view,  judging  that 
some of the educational  standards  applied  in regular  public  employment 
were  unnecessary  and that these  might  be bent  in response  to federal  pro- 
grams  that gave  preference  to less-educated  workers. 
These  issues  led to a general  discussion  of the  displacement  effect.  Martin 
Feldstein  was concerned  about public-service  jobs displacing  private  em- 
ployment  as well  as other  jobs in the public  sector.  He inferred  some sub- 
stitution  of public  for private  jobs from Wiseman's  findings  that only a 
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ment  insurance  at the time  of starting  the program  job. Although  granting 
that  a vacated  private  job could  be filled  by somebody  else,  Feldstein  noted 
that, even in recession,  private  vacancies  are not filled  instantaneously;  in 
effect, the EJ parameter  in Tobin's  model is a source of leakage.  Holt 
stressed  that the funds  freed  by the so-called  displacement  effect  may still 
exert  a substantial  stimulus  by leading  to lower  taxes  and hence  increased 
private  spending  or more  state  and  local spending  on other  programs.  Un- 
like Feldstein,  he did not interpret  the low figure on unemployment- 
insurance  beneficiaries  at the time of starting  public-service  jobs as a 
symptom  of either  high displacement  or poor implementation.  Given the 
lag between  hiring  and  employment,  a person  who starts  his public-service 
job may be leaving a strictly  fill-in private  job that he landed after he 
applied  for the public-service  job. 
Gramlich  commented  that, the higher  the displacement  rate, the more 
the impact  of public  employment  approaches  that of general  revenue  shar- 
ing,  and  the  stronger  the  case  for  countercyclical  general  grants  to state  and 
local governments.  Such grants would enable them to maintain their 
employment  in ways that they find most efficient  and to avoid cyclically 
perverse  personnel  policies.  Wachter,  on the other  hand,  saw a high long- 
run displacement  rate as a safety  valve on the program,  ensuring  that it 
really  became  the equivalent  of general  revenue  sharing  (rather  than dis- 
torting  the composition  of state and local employment)  when prosperity 
was restored. 
A number  of participants  commented  on Tobin's  tentative  endorsement 
of a wage  subsidy  applicable  to private  or public  employment.  Feldstein 
was a strong  supporter  of this approach;  he reminded  the group  that, for 
private  goods  as well  as for  public  ones,  the social  opportunity  cost of labor 
is far  below  the  going  wage  when  unemployment  is high.  The  ideal  counter- 
cyclical  job-creating  program  should  not discriminate  between  public  and 
private  employment,  he concluded.  Tobin  amplified  his original  comment 
by sketching  a voucher  proposal  that had been advanced  by Guy Orcutt. 
According  to that  plan, vouchers  would  be given  to individuals  who meet 
certain  eligibility  requirements  that establish  their difficulties  in the labor 
market.  The voucher  could be transferred  either  to a public or a private 
employer  and  would  be cashable  so that the federal  government  paid  part 
of the  wages  of the worker.  R. J. Gordon  was  attracted  in principle  by such 
a program  but  wondered  how the  eligibility  standards  might  be determined 
and how the balance  could be struck  to set subsidies  high enough  to be 
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Sims on how subsidy  programs  might  wind down, Tobin stated  that the 
voucher  program  would  not be purely  countercyclical  but would  respond 
countercyclically  since  the eligible  population  would  wind  itself  down  in a 
prosperous  economy.  Perry  wondered  whether  that might not introduce 
a procyclical  inflationary  effect,  since  the  wage  costs  borne  by the employer 
would  be reduced  substantially  by the subsidy  during  recession  but only a 
little  in times  of high employment. 
Wachter  agreed  that  the subsidization  of private  jobs deserved  more  ex- 
ploration,  but thought  that manpower  training  also merited  greater  em- 
phasis.  He felt that  training  programs  had not received  a fair  trial.  Feilner 
also supported  training  programs,  particularly-in line with R. A. Gor- 
don's  judgment-as a way to deal  jointly with structural  and cyclical  em- 
ployment  problems.  Fellner  stated  the criterion  that,  any  time  it is possible 
to build,  through  training  programs,  human  capital  with social  value  that 
exceeds  the cost of such programs  over and above the cost of income 
maintenance,  such  training  is clearly  advantageous. 
Barry  Bosworth  offered  several  arguments  in favor  of some reliance  on 
countercyclical  public-service  employment.  He considered  it likely that 
more  net new  jobs would  be created  by public-service  employment  than  by 
subsidies  to private  employers,  which  might,  in part,  merely  defray  some 
private  labor  costs. More generally,  he felt that training  and private  sub- 
sidies might be complements  to public-service  employment,  rather  than 
substitutes  for  it. Job  experience  and  habit  formation,  which  are  important 
in most training  efforts,  might be developed  effectively  by public-service 
jobs. Moreover,  whenever  mistakes  were  made  in stabilization  policy that 
brought  the unemployment  rate far above levels justified  on anti-infla- 
tionary  grounds,  he felt that  the real  choices  were  between  income  mainte- 
nance and public-service  jobs. Bosworth  was impressed  by Wiseman's 
finding  that the program  jobs were  productive;  they also seemed  to con- 
tribute  to worker  satisfaction.  He thought  the programs  were  superior  to 
extended  unemployment-insurance  benefits  and to welfare  payments,  and 
could be made even more effective  with the administrative  reforms  that 
were  recommended  in the paper.  Wiseman  supported  Bosworth's  view  that 
the CETA  experience  had refuted  the "leaf-raking"  concern.  He expressed 
his own reservations  about the likely response  of the private  sector  to a 
countercyclical  offer  of job subsidies.  Moreover,  he doubted  that the mar- 
ginal  product  of employees  in the public  sector  is much lower than that 
which  would  be attained  in the private  sector. 